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"If there is any fact which may be supposed to be known by every-
body, and, therefore, by courts, it is that swamps and stagnant waters are
the cause of malarial and malignant fevers, and that the police power is
never more legitimately exercised than in removing such nuisances. "I
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I. A SWAMP BY MADISONIAN DESIGN
Since Hobbes, the "central question of liberal political theory has
been how, in a world marked by the legitimate and reasonable pursuit of
self-interest, government can be sustained.- 2 Madison's iconic solution
was to enlarge the "practicable sphere" of the state,3 scaling it up to ena-
ble factions to check each other, averting the tyranny they might inflict
were they to dominate.4 But the "mutability" Madison saw in the laws of
the original states also convinced him that stabilizing legal relations was
key.5 And he expected these states and his new republic to check each
other, 6 seeing in their competition a novel and unique security to liber-
ty.7 Finally, Madison had a hand in the grand compromise behind our
federal judiciary.8 He championed the Convention's decision to let Con-
2. DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 70 (3d ed. 2006).
3. See Lance Banning, The Practicable Sphere of a Republic: James Madison, the Constitu-
tional Convention, and the Emergence of Revolutionary Federalism, in BEYOND
CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 162
(Richard Beeman et al. eds., 1987).
4. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 64 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ("Ex-
tend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable
that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if
such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own
strength, and to act in unison with each other.").
5. See James Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in JAMES
MADISON: WRITINGS 69, 75 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999).
6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 350-52; Banning, supra note 3, at 170.
7. See Peter S. Onuff, State Sovereignty and the Making of the Constitution, in
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 78 (Terence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock eds., 1988).
On Madison's special influence in the horizontal and vertical structuring, as well as its earliest
"liquidation" into the practical politics of the Federalist and Jeffersonian years, see LANCE
BANNING, THE SACRED FIRE OF LIBERTY: JAMES MADISON AND THE FOUNDING OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC (1995); DREw McCoY, THE LAST OF THE FATHERS: JAMES MADISON
(1986). On his efforts in retirement to "spin" his own role and his evident disinterest in the judici-
ary, see MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON'S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION 117-18 (2015).
8. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
4-19 (7th ed. 2015) (collecting research describing the Convention's debates and structuring of
Article III and Madison's influence); Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties,
and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 39, 58-68 (1995). The inferior tribunals
Article I empowers Congress to "constitute," together with the lower courts Article III empowers
it to "ordain and establish," have long tested the boundaries between distinct congressional author-
ities. See James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 646-71 (2004); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL
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gress structure the judiciary and its relationship to state courts while
framing Article III to elevate the appointment, tenure, and salary of its
judges.9
This architecture, by splitting up the authority to make law, 10 aimed
to keep all but the strongest coalitions from changing federal law
through Article I, § 7.11 But if Madison's legend has alternatively cast
legal battles as prelude to compromise and substitute for violence, 12 his
vision has become a pathology to our waters as natural resources. As
drought, depletion, wetland losses, toxic tides, and hypoxic dead zones
all mount and sea-level rise accelerates, it grows increasingly evident
that dangerous problems in and around the nation's waters are not being
resolved.' 3 The party duopoly our Constitution entrenches bears little as
reliably as it does gridlock and voter antipathy.14 By aligning private in-
terests against fifty-two rival governments, it makes common cause in-
creasingly uncommon. It gives few assurances of accurately distinguish-
ing the local from the national 5 or infringement from governance.
16
COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 40-50 (2d ed. 1996); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHOICES 47-65, 84-98 (1985).
9. See JULIUS GOEBEL, JR., I HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, at 245-48 (1971).
10. See SAMUEL H. BEER, TO MAKE A NATION: REDISCOVERY OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM
(1993); JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990); Larry H. Kra-
mer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485 (1994); Michael W. McConnell, Feder-
alism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1492-1507 (1987); cf JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 17-30 (1962) (distinguishing normative theories of collective ac-
tion from descriptive accounts).
11. See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956) (calling Madison's
account of the Constitution "institutionalist" and describing its fixation on inter-institutional
checking); HELD, supra note 2, at 160-65; Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safe-
guard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001); William N. Eskridgc, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
The Article], Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1991).
12. See GREG WEINER, MADISON'S METRONOME: THE CONSTITUTION, MAJORITY RULE,
AND THE TEMPO OF AMERICAN POLITICS (2012). Madison was not without peers. But the record,
as with his noted accounts of majoritarian tyranny, is uniquely developed in his case. See BILDER,
supra note 7, at 6-7; DAHL, supra note 11, at 4-5.
13. See Rhett B. Larson, Water Security, 112 Nw. U. L. REV. 139, 164-80 (2017).
14. See KEITH KREHBIEL, PIVOTAL POLITICS: A THEORY OF U.S. LAWMAKING 227-36
(1998); James A. Gardner, Madison's Hope: Virtue, Self-Interest, and the Design of Electoral Sys-
tems, 86 IOWA L. REV. 87, 89-90 (2000); Richard H. Pildes, Romanticizing Democracy, Political
Fragmentation, and the Decline of American Government, 124 YALE L.J. 804 (2014); Richard H.
Pildes, Why the Center Does Not Hold: The Causes of fyperpolarized Democracy in America, 99
CAL. L. REV. 273 (2011).
15. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federal-
ism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215 (2000) (arguing that party duopoly and discipline motivate Con-
gress above all to respect state autonomy). "Inflexible divisions between what is national and what
STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 39:3
Indeed, unless we count indecision, indeterminacy, or disengagement as
ends in themselves, we must confront the possibility that our jurisdic-
tion-splitting tendencies are not fit for today's resource crises."7
Three jurisdictional jams make the case. The first is an old, familiar
problem for many in the West. State law rights to appropriate water that
compete with federal reserved rights to use the same waters have long
opposed state to federal law and jurisdiction. 18 Federal reservations-for
Indian communities, national forests, parks, monuments, or other federal
ends-impliedly retained whatever water uses were necessary to their
ends.19 This body of federal common law should preempt inconsistent
state law. 20 Yet most water rights are adjudicated in state courts, leaving
them the bulk of that job subject only to the Supreme Court's certiorari
jurisdiction. 21 But when a state court elaborates federal law, the authori-
tative force behind its declarations ebbs. 22 Indeed, with reserved rights
grounded in federal law,23 "reverse-Erie" problems now feature in the
is local ceased long ago to make sense, a product of profound cultural, economic, and technologi-
cal changes .... And, so, from Dred Scott to the New Deal to National League of Cities, the Jus-
tices' rare efforts to impose their views of the proper limits of federal power have been controver-
sial failures that accomplished little other than to damage the Court's reputation." Id. at 289.
16. See STEVEN LEVITSKY & DANIEL ZIBLATT, How DEMOCRACIES DIE 118-75 (2018);
NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 240-76.
17. Part V isolates causes and paths forward.
18. See, e.g., Lawrence J. MacDonnell, General Stream Adjudications, the McCarran
Amendment, and Reserved Water Rights, 15 WYO. L. REV. 313 (2015); Scott B. McElroy & Jeff J.
Davis, Revisiting Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States-There Must be a
Better Way, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 597 (1995); John E. Thorson ct al., Dividing Western Waters: A
Century of Adjudicating Rivers and Streams, Part 1I, 9 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 299, 337-432
(2006); John E. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters. A Century of Adjudicating River and
Streams, 8 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 355, 442-61 (2005).
19. See Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908). Once such a federal reserved
right has been adjudicated, that judgment binds the United States and operates to preclude the fur-
ther litigation of the same claim(s). See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 129-32 (1983).
20. See, e.g., Nevada, 463 U.S. at 116 n.1; United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700-
02 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 138-41 (1976). Like other federal common
law, it rests in uneasy tension with the text of the Supremacy Clause-which mentions only feder-
al "Laws ... made" as superior in force to state law. See Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy
Clause Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 758-61 (2010).
21. See Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe of Ariz., 463 U.S. 545, 569 (1983) (providing
state courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate Indian water rights held in trust by the United States).
22. See infra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
23. Cf Cappaert, 426 U.S. at 138 ("Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Com-
merce Clause ... which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property
Clause ... which permits federal regulation of federal lands.") (citations omitted); United States v.
City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1, 16 (Colo. 1982) (noting the state court's duty under the Su-
premacy Clause to apply federal law to the federal lands' reserved rights).
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state court judgments adjudicating these rights. 24 Moreover, any court's
jurisdiction to adjudicate the legal status of a thing depends on that ju-
risdiction's relationship to that thing.25 No judgment rendered in the ab-
sence of a sufficient relationship should be a binding judgment.26 And
with many waters this sufficiency is open to considerable doubts. All of
these questions at the federal/state jurisdictional interface now cloud
many Western water rights and will do so more in the coming years.
A second jam derives in part from the first. When government inter-
feres with a water right, claims of "takings" liability will arise.27 Chal-
lenges to changes in the law affecting water rights, however, can easily
bounce between state and federal forums and rules of decision. If it is
federal interference and the claimed loss exceeds $10,000 in value, the
claim presumptively belongs in the United States Court of Federal
Claims (CFC) by specific jurisdictional statute-the Tucker Act.28 But
few water rights are both vested and then denied by federal authority.
29
Any state taking actionable by federal right must be "final" before a fed-
eral forum may take jurisdiction, 30 a prerequisite that itself has grown
24. See Robert T. Anderson, Water Rights, Water Quality, and Regulatory Jurisdiction in
Indian Country, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 195, 206-14 (2015). As Professor Clermont puts it, "[b]y
reverse-Erie, federal law flows down to govern in state court. Under currently expressed views of
the doctrine, however, it does so by uncertain means and to an uncertain extent." Kevin M. Cler-
mont, Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 5 (2006).
25. See, e.g., Phillips Petro. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 817-20 (1985); Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 207-11 (1977). "Territorial" jurisdiction is usually distinguished from subject mat-
ter jurisdiction and no attempt is made here to do otherwise.
26. See RESTATEMENT (2D) OF JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982) ("A state may exercise jurisdiction
to determine interests in a thing if the relationship of the thing to the state is such that the exercise
of jurisdiction is reasonable."). This is increasingly problematic in the context of waters. Cf id. at
§ 6 cmt. a (noting challenges of determining whether an intangible thing is "present" within a ju-
risdiction allowing forum's adjudication of legal relations to the thing).
27. See Brian E. Gray, The Property Right in Water, 9 WEST-NW. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (2002).
Takings liability under federal law stems from the Fifth Amendment's clause forbidding "private
property [from being] taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Beginning in the twentieth century this guarantee was extended to the "taking" of property's use
and economic value by regulation. See infra notes 243-50 and accompanying text.
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2008). The Court of Federal Claims is an Article I "tribunal" the
judges of which serve 15-year terms after presidential nomination and senatorial confirmation. Id.
§§ 171-172. Federal district courts have concurrent jurisdiction under the so-called "Little Tucker
Act" to hear (non-contract) claims against the United States for amounts not exceeding $10,000.
Id. § 1346.
29. Federal courts construing state law confront a familiar list of troubles. See Bradford R.
Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie,
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459 (1997). Certifying question(s) to the appropriate state court(s) is one so-
lution, see, e.g., Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 515-20 (Fed. Cir. 2011), alt-
hough it can be problematic as well. See infra notes 307-11 and accompanying text.
30. See Williamson Cty. Reg. Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 196-97
(1985); see also Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 306 (1989) (construing 28 U.S.C.
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deeply uncertain. 31 A state supreme court's attempt to declare its com-
mon law of water rights, for example, once brought decades of acrimo-
nious litigation before an ultimate conclusion that the claimants' case
was premature. 32 Astonishingly complex claims now regularly arise
from the federal government's moves to reallocate the water it has de-
veloped throughout the West. 33 Much of the actual water diverted today
only became available because of these costly federal programs. 34 But
the private interest in most water is already elusive enough when un-
complicated by that overlay of federal law and jurisdiction. When these
reclamation dimensions are added to the takings calculus, the jurisdic-
tional issues can eclipse all others.35
Finally, there is the epitome of jurisdiction splitting. The Clean Wa-
ter Act's (CWA) geographic scope is defined by CWA § 502(7) as the
"waters of the United States." 36 The Supreme Court once noted in dicta
that this could mean "virtually all surface water in the country.- 3 7 But its
three attempts to resolve things38 have joined mountains of lower court
opinions to deeply ambiguous effect.39 By 2007, its jurisdictional mud-
dle had become acutely problematic, 40 a status quo that has now been
traded between parties in power and shows no sign of abating.41 When
the administering agencies-the Environmental Protection Agency
.(EPA) and Army Corps of Engineers-attempted a rulemaking fix in
§ 1257 jurisdiction over states' "[tlinal judgments or decrees" as mandatory barrier to Supreme
Court review of state court proceedings).
31. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
32. See Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215, 219 (9th Cir. 1989).
33. Part Il1(B) explains.
34. See CHARLES F. WILKINSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDtAN: LAND, WATER, AND THE
FUTURE OF THE WEST (1992). Thus, what is called "project water" "would not exist but for the
fact that it has been developed by the United States." Israel v. Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132 (9th Cir.
1977). With state and federal law combining to provide contracted rights to project water as avail-
able, jurisdictional and preemption issues have long dominated water claims in the affected re-
sources. See Reed D. Benson, Whose Water Is It? Private Rights and Public Authority Over Rec-
lamation Project Water, 16 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 363, 369-408 (1997).
35. See infra notes 312-34 and accompanying text.
36. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
37. See Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 486 & n.6 (1987).
38. See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715 (2006); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook
Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001); United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
39. See Jamison E. Colbum, Governing the Gradient: Clarity and Discretion at the Water's
Edge, 62 VILL. L. REv. 81, 87-93 (2017).
40. Part IV(A) explains.
41. See Colburn, Governing the Gradient, supra note 39, at 95-115.
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2015,42 their rule faced over a dozen court challenges, pulling the Su-
preme Court into a jurisdictional battle over challenges to the rulemak-
ing.43 In Nat'l Ass 'n of Mfrs. v. Dept. of Defense,44 it held that pre-
enforcement challenges were not within the scope of the CWA's special
jurisdiction provision, CWA § 509(b)(1) 45 and must be heard (if at all)
in district court under § 1331 and the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA).46 Yet suits of the kind can resolve little about the validity of ad-
ministrative rules.47 With a second Trump Administration rule now in
progress,48 jurisdictional uncertainty will continue to plague the CWA,
clouding its prescribed controls for the governance of jurisdictional wa-
ters.
49
These three concentrations of jurisdictional disorder advance a sim-
ple thesis: waters in our federal system-the divided sovereignty of 'We
the People'-are becoming increasingly ungovernable due in good part
to our obsession with dividing the authority to declare the law. This may
be a "national neurosis," 5° but waters have aggravated it immensely.
Waters exist along a gradient marked by ambulatory if not indeterminate
42. See Final Rule-Clean Water Rule: Definition of "Waters of the United States," 80 Fed.
Reg. 37053, 37054 (June 29, 2015).
43. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v. Dep't of Def., 138 S. Ct. 617, 627 (2018).
44. 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018).
45. 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(1) (2012). The Clean Water Act (CWA), like the Clean Air Act,
makes special provision for challenging particular EPA actions implementing the statute. Unlike
the Clean Air Act, however, the CWA's list of covered actions includes no catchall providing for
jurisdiction in all cases of nationally significant actions and does not consolidate the covered ac-
tions in a single court. See Nat'lAss'n Mfrs., 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018).
46. See Nat'l Ass 'n Mfrs., 138 S. Ct. at 628-34. "If at all" because pre-enforcement review
of rulemakings, especially where the rules are "interpretative," is subject to a list of "ripeness,"
finality, and other prudential barriers fashioned by the Court. See Steven J. Lindsay, Timing Judi-
cial Review of Agency Interpretations in Chevron's Shadow, 127 YALE L.J. 2448, 2456-65 (2018)
(discussing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001), Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154 (1997), and FTC v. Standard Oil of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980)).
47. See infra notes 470-76 and accompanying text.
48. Two U.S. district courts vacated and issued national injunctions against the Trump Ad-
ministration's attempt to suspend the Obama Administration rule in fall 2018. See Puget Sound-
keeper All. v. Wheeler, No. C15-1342-JCC, 2018 WL 6169196 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 26, 2018);
South Carolina Coastal Conservation League v. Pruitt, 318 F. Supp. 3d 959 (D.S.C. 2018). The
Trump Administration's attempt at a substitute was proposed in February 2019. See Revised Defi-
nition of "Waters of the United States," 84 Fed. Reg. 4154 (proposed Feb. 14, 2019).
49. The 2015 rule remains in effect in 22 states, the District of Columbia, and U.S. Territo-
ries. See Revised Definition of "Waters of the United States," 84 Fed. Reg. at 4162. In 28 states
the 2015 rule remains preliminarily enjoined while two merits cases are heard. Id. at 4161-62 (de-
scribing injunctions in Texas v. EPA, No. 3:15-CV-00162, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160443 (S.D.
Tex. Sep. 12, 2018); North Dakota v. EPA, 127 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (D.N.D. 2015)).
50. See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neuro-
sis, 41 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 903, 905-06 (1994).
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boundaries. They change rapidly in quantity, quality, and value,5' a
function of the planet's hydrologic cycles and of our growth. The basins
making them cover hundreds and thousands of square miles. But be-
cause their values are so spatially and temporally varied (it once was a
certainty that wetlands cause malaria), waters invite dispute without end.
Indeed, the resource itself may engender suspicion by resisting posses-
sion of any real or normal sort. Thus, one party, place, or state's reach
for water will almost surely threaten someone, somewhere else. Adapta-
tion can dissipate these rivalries, but the resource itself invites conflict
all the same.
Jurisdiction is the authority to decide and declare legal relations-
the rights, duties, privileges, powers, immunities, etc., of law.52 Judicial
jurisdiction is conventionally divided along two axes, personal and sub-
ject matter,53 and is territorialized by contacts and interests. 54 Each is di-
visible vertically and horizontally. But "Our Federalism" 55 also divides
what might be called jurisdiction to prescribe,56 making each of the
foregoing divisions divisible. Thus, for example, fragments of jurisdic-
tion were what Congress was thought to have delegated in the CWA,
where EPA's "Administrator is authorized to prescribe such regulations
as are necessary to carry out his functions under th[e Act], 57 while
elsewhere announcing that "the authority of each State to allocate the
quantities of water within its jurisdiction shall not be superseded, abro-
51. See, e.g., DAVID OWEN, WHERE THE WATER GOES: LIFE AND DEATH ALONG THE
COLORADO RIVER 226-59 (2017).
52. Cf Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction and Its Effects, 105 GEO. L.J. 619, 627 (2017) (labelling
this a "watered down" definition of jurisdiction). Bentham first proposed a conception of distinct
legal relations and discrete means of their decision and declaration. See H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM: STUDIES IN JURISPRUDENCE AND POLITICAL THEORY 190-93 (1982).
53. See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583-88 (1999) (holding that federal
courts are not bound to decide subject matter or personal jurisdictional issues in any sequence be-
cause neither is more fundamental than the other). "The character of the two jurisdictional bed-
rocks unquestionably differs. Subject-matter limitations on federal jurisdiction serve institutional
interests. They keep the federal courts within the bounds the Constitution and Congress have pre-
scribed .... Personal jurisdiction, on the other hand, 'represents a restriction on judicial power...
as a matter of individual liberty."' Id. at 583-84.
54. See Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1988).
55. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1970).
56. For our purposes, "vertical" allocations of jurisdiction are some demarcation between
state and federal competence where "horizontal" allocations demarcate peer jurisdictions' compe-
tences. See Joseph P. Bauer, The Erie Doctrine Revisited: How a Conflicts Perspective Can Aid
the Analysis, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1999).
57. 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a).
[Vol. 39:3
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gated or otherwise impaired.- 58 Finally, although there can be no federal
"commandeering" of state jurisdiction to prescribe,59 state courts' duty
to adjudicate federal law60 has entailed a wide range of problems for wa-
ters.
Part II introduces the adjudication of water disputes and how juris-
diction embeds competing state and federal interests in the law and any
resulting judgments. Part III examines a particular type of water right
and how its alleged taking became a jurisdictional muddle. Part IV
tracks the syndrome into the CWA's delegated jurisdiction(s) to pre-
scribe controls on the pollution of waters. Part V considers possibilities
for reform.
II. CHOICES OF LAW: VERTICAL, HORIZONTAL, OTHER
More than most, the field of water rights reveals courts' discretion to
fashion their own jurisdiction and rules of decision. After almost a cen-
tury of "reasonable" use riparianism's development in the eastern United
States, 6 1 western state judiciaries forged a novel kind of private interest
in surface waters. 62 Their appropriative rights rewarded whoever first
put water diverted from a stream or river to a "beneficial" use with own-
58. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(g); see also id. § 1251(b) (declaring the "policy of the Congress to
recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, re-
duce, and eliminate pollution").
59. See Murphy v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475-76 (2018) (noting
that the anti-commandeering principle "may sound arcane," but it, like the Supremacy Clause, is
an essential element of our system of "dual sovereignty").
60. See Evan H. Caminker, State Sovereignty and Subordinacy: May Congress Commandeer
State Officers to Implement Federal Law?, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1001, 1022-60 (1995) (observing
that state judiciaries are regularly "commandeered" into the administration of federal law by hav-
ing to adjudicate federal claims and apply federal law in their courts).
61. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' Sch., 103 N.E. 87, 87 (Mass. 1913) ("The com-
mon law rights and obligations of riparian owners upon streams are not open to doubt."). Sympa-
thetically interpreted, English precedents requiring that a water's natural flow remain unimpeded
were adapted into an Americanized "liability rule" restraining only those diversions and uses
harming others precisely because the courts aimed to support the productive use of surface waters.
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, 34-47 (1977);
see, e.g., Stratton, 103 N.E. at 88-89 (adapting the common law rule forbidding transfers of with-
drawn water out of the watershed to one forcing downstream riparians to first prove the harm done
to them by the diversion). Such adaptations can set a special kind of jurisdictional trap, though, as
Part III shows.
62. See ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS 59-98 (1983). It
was not entirely novel. Eastern courts had heard and rejected first-in-time arguments for, in their
view, a tendency toward monopoly "meant that 'the public, whose advantage is always to be re-
garded, would be deprived of the benefit which always attends competition and rivalry."'
HORWITZ, supra note 61, at 43 (quoting Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 307, 314 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1805)).
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ership of the diversion, regardless of where the use occurred or who had
to go without.63 This first-in-time rule broke from the doctrines that pre-
ceded it by vesting robust entitlements in what had seemed like an in-
herently public64 thing.65 But they have always been interests of an unu-
sual sort.
First, "beneficial use" remains the basis, measure, and limit of these
interests. 66 Whatever water is not put to use is no part of an entitle-
ment.6 7 Second, even a senior right-holder may not change use(s) so as
to substantially harm others.68 Paired with the seniority system's con-
ventions against waste69 and the robust forfeiture and abandonment laws
most Western states maintain,7" this interest is therefore heavily quali-
63. See Atchison v. Petcrson, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 507, 510-11 (1874) (Field, J.). A locus
classicus of this ownership theory of appropriation is Hutchins' Water Rights Laws in the Nine-
teen Western States. See WELLS A. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN
WESTERN STATES 147 (1971). The first-in-time appropriative right was calculated to attract set-
tlers and investment and that it did-for irrigated agriculture, mining, and other low-margin forms
of production. See DUNBAR, supra note 62, at 209-11; Lawrence J. MacDonnell, Prior Appropria-
tion: A Reassessment, 18 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 228, 242-78 (2015).
64. Compare Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971) ("The power of the state to
control, regulate and utilize its navigable waterways and the lands lying beneath them, when act-
ing within the terms of the [public] trust, is absolute ... except as limited by the paramount super-
visory power of the federal government over navigable waters.") (citations omitted), with United
States v. Gerlach Live Stock, Co., 339 U.S. 725, 744 (1950) ("As long ago as the Institutes of Jus-
tinian, running waters, like the air and the sea, were res communes-things common to all and
property of none.").
65. See DUNBAR, supra note 62, 209-17; HORWITZ, supra note 61, at 105-06; MacDonnell,
supra note 63, at 242-67.
66. See, e.g., Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 41-3-101 (2014) ("Beneficial use shall be the basis, the
measure and limit of the right to use water at all times."); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517,
527-28 (1936); HUTCHINS, supra note 63, at 439 ("Several statutes declare the historic principle,
thus expressed.. . 'Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the
use of water."').
67. Compare Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town Co., 205 F. 123, 129 (8th Cir.
1913) (holding that an appropriation for scenic beauty alone was insufficient as a beneficial use),
with Colo. River Water Conserv. Dist. v. Rocky Mtn. Power Co., 406 P.2d 798, 800-01 (Colo.
1965) (holding that water left in a river has not been appropriated for a beneficial use, regardless
of the habitat values served thereby).
68. See Taiawagi Helton & Rhett Larson, Reallocations, Transfers, and Changes, in
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 14.04(c) (3d ed. 2017); George Gould, Water Rights Transfers
and Third-Party Effects, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 5 (1988).
69. See MacDonnell, supra note 63, at 294 ("[S]tates have authority to enact laws regulating
the manner in which water rights are used. To date, states have been remarkably unwilling to ex-
ercise this authority."); Steve J. Shupe, Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change, 61
ORE. L. REV. 483, 491 (1982) (noting that the legal standard for eliminating fractions of an appro-
priation because of "waste" is the local customary usage for the beneficial use at issue).
70. See MacDonnell, supra note 63, at 300-02; Janet C. Neuman & Keith Hirokawa, How
Good Is an Old Water Right? The Application of Statutory Forfeiture Provisions to Pre-Code Wa-
ter Rights, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1 (2000).
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fled.7 1 All of that has complicated appropriative rights' status as proper-
ty.72 Indeed, with most streams and rivers throughout the West having
long been over-appropriated, protection from loss or reallocation has be-
come synonymous with water rights.73 A shows how allocations of fed-
eral and state jurisdiction have clouded those protections and blocked
the entitlement delineation that might enable better private ordering. B
explains the withdrawal of federal jurisdiction and the jurisdictional pol-
icies that have left these disputes stranded in state courts lacking the au-
thority to adjudicate them fully.
A. Federal Jurisdiction and Waters: Hybridizing Rules of Decision
Federal supremacy means at least that state law rights to use waters
must yield to contrary federal law,7 4 including federal common law.7 5 It
was federal common law that first confirmed to the nonoriginal states
their sovereign title to the beds, banks, and flowing waters of the navi-
gable rivers, streams, and lakes, and all tidelands within their territo-
ry 76 -to whatever extent not displaced by other federal law. 77 Federal
71. Cf HUTCHINS, supra note 63, at 443 n.30 ("Although an interest in realty, the appropri-
ative right is a right of use and is subject to loss as a result of nonuse. It thus differs from title to
land.").
72. Unlike most types of property, appropriative rights have robust prohibitions on specula-
tive accumulation. See Gregory Hobbs, Reviving the Public Ownership, Antispeculation, and Ben-
eficial Use Moorings of Prior Appropriation Law, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 128-32 (2013).
73. See OWEN, supra note 51.
74. Compare Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 210-11 (1824) (vacating injunction to enforce
state law navigation monopoly on grounds that it was Congress's authority to regulate interstate
commerce), with United States v. Rio Grande Dam & lrr. Co., 174 U.S. 690, 709-10 (1899) (hold-
ing that a state-created right to impound and appropriate so much of the Rio Grande as to impair
its downstream navigability must necessarily yield to any federal common law right of riparianism
or to the flow needed for navigation).
75. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 11, at 1452-57; Henry J. Friendly, In Praise ofErie-and of
the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964); Alfred Hill, The Law-Making
Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1024 (1967).
76. See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. 576, 589-93 (2012); Phillips Petro. Co. v.
Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476-84 (1988); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374-76 (1988); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 554-57 (1981);
Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1894); Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876). This
"rule assumed federal constitutional significance under the equal-footing doctrine. In 1842, the
Court declared that for the 13 original States, the people of each State, based on principles of sov-
ereignty, 'hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and soils under them, subject only to
rights surrendered and powers granted by the Constitution to the Federal Government."' PPL
Montana, 565 U.S. at 590 (quoting Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 16 U.S. (Pet.) 367, 410 (1842)).
77. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 550-57 (1981); United States v. Oregon,
295 U.S. 1 (1935). This includes the federal "navigation servitude." See, e.g., United States v. Re-
public Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); United States v. Commodore Park, 324 U.S. 386 (1945);
United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53
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statutes dating from 1866 declared homesteaders and other entries upon
the public domain throughout the West would have to vest their water
rights under state law. 78 Yet, by contrast, federal reservations, i.e., land
areas reserved in trust for the public or for an Indian tribe, came to in-
clude their own water rights under federal common law.7 9 (The federal
interest in that water was apparently "brooding" about8° until finally de-
clared in 1908.81) Federal reserved rights have ever since been thought
beyond state law's control, 82 although a majority of the Supreme Court
could obviously change that.83
At the epicenter here, thus, are some of our federalism's most intrac-
table problems. Recall that the Judiciary Act of 1789 was for more than
a century understood to authorize federal courts to declare "general" law
in cases before them, contrary local law notwithstanding.8 4 Indeed, ad-
miralty jurisdiction-the lower federal courts' principal grant of original
jurisdiction in 1789-nominally still authorizes as much in "maritime"
cases.85 But in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,86 the Supreme Court held
(1913); South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 4 (1876); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Bel-
mont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
78. See PAUL WALLACE GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT 635-98
(1968). Construing the Desert Land Act and General Mining Act in California Oregon Power Co.
v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158 (1935), the Court held that the statutes had
severed unappropriated waters on the public domain and left their appropriation to state law (sub-
ject to the federal interests in use of federally reserved lands and in navigation). Id. at 158-59. See
also Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prods. Co., 436 U.S. 604, 614 (1978).
79. See Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S.
696 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); Federal Power Comm'n v. Oregon,
349 U.S. 435 (1955); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
80. Cf S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The com-
mon law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some sovereign or
quasi-sovereign that can be identified ....
81. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 577-78.
82. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576. Henry Winters's claim against the United States and the
Fort Belknap reservation was itself a claim that he and other upstream irrigators had long diverted
to beneficial uses whatever water might otherwise have been allocated to the reservation. See
DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER SETT7LEMENTS AND THE
SECOND TREATY ERA 9-14 (2002). Two lower federal courts and the Supreme Court all rejected
the claim. See Winters, 207 U.S. at 576-78.
83. See infra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
84. See HORwrTz, supra note 61, at 245-52; William A. Fletcher, General Common Law
and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1513, 1517-38 (1984); Stewart Jay, The Origins of Federal Common Law: Part I1, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 1231, 1267-71 (1985); Stewart Jay, The Origins of Federal Common Law: Part 1, 133 U.
PA. L. REV. 1003, 1034-38 (1985).
85. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 688-90; Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law:
A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1245, 1332 (1996). The passage from the pre-
Erie theory of admiralty to its modem, fitful existence somewhere between an authorized and a
redundant 'enclave' of federal common law took decades. See DAVID W. ROBERTSON,
2019] DON'T GO IN THE WATER
that federal courts lacked such authority and rather must look to local
law unless it is preempted by the Constitution, federal statute, or court
rule.87 The Erie Court's practical aims were to harmonize adjudications
in state and federal forums,8 8 but its legal bases are debated still today.
89
Eight decades on, indeed, Erie remains a sea of cross-currents and con-
tradictions.90 What is the proper scope today of a federal common law of
waters or reserved rights?9 ' Any answer will turn on archaic federal
ADMIRALTY AND FEDERALISM (1970). But admiralty jurisdiction remains the exemplar. The 1789
Act's vesting of exclusive original jurisdiction was only to the extent that such jurisdiction had
been exercised by admiralty courts before the Constitution. Cf The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 411 (1867) (limiting exclusivity of 1789 grant to in rem actions against a vessel or its car-
go). The Court has occasionally adopted state law as federal maritime law. See, e.g., Yamaha Mo-
tor Corp. v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
86. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
87. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 74-76; see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE,
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 387 (6th ed. 2002). But see Hill, supra note 75, at 1073-81 (arguing
the Constitution presumes a great deal of "judicial creativity" and that federal common law de-
rives its preemptive force from the Supremacy Clause despite not appearing expressly therein);
Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805 (1989) ("[T]here are no
fundamental constraints on the fashioning of federal rules of decision."). Federal common law's
unique footing-preemptive where valid yet arguably narrower than both state common law or
federal legislative authority-survived Erie, though not fully intact. See Martha A. Field, Sources
of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986).
88. See WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 87, at 379-82 (discussing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1960), Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), and the twin "Erie doctrine" aims of
discouraging forum shopping and avoiding inequitable administration of the laws); John Hart Ely,
The Irrepressible Myth of Eric, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 714-15 & n. 125 (1974) (discussing Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), and its holding that Erie required federal
courts sitting in diversity to apply the forum state's choice of law doctrines, as the "Erie doc-
trine"); Field, supra note 87, at 899-902.
89. See Kermit Roosevelt 111, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to
CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 8 (2012) ("There is a surprising amount of disa-
greement about Erie's constitutional source.").
90. See Ely, supra note 88, at 696 (comparing the Court's explanations of Erie over the
years to "shadows on cave walls"); Roosevelt, supra note 89, at 2 ("Erie analysis is notorious for
the puzzles it has produced."). See generally Craig Green, Repressing Erie's Myth, 96 CAL. L.
REV. 595 (2008). Erie left federal courts to adopt state law into federal, to choose between states
in horizontal choices of law, and to create enclaves of federal law protecting vital federal interests.
See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the
Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797 (1957). Some even argue
it left courts to decide whether and to what extent interpretive methods are binding. See Abbe
Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie For the Age of Statutes, 54
WM. & MARY L. REV. 753 (2013).
91. Even after Erie the Court repeatedly endorsed the spontaneous recognition of preemp-
tive federal "interests." See, e.g., Semtek, Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508
(2001); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 436-39 (1996); Boyle v. United
Techns. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1942).
Thus, in a suit brought by the United States against a neighboring landowner pumping groundwa-
ter and thereby imperiling Devil's Hole National Monument, as to the United States' claim to any
"unappropriated" water, the Court declared that "[f]ederal water rights are not dependent upon
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statutes, pre-Erie precedents, varying state law and constitutions, and
more,92 often to dizzying effect.93
Original and appellate federal jurisdictions have long been incon-
gruent in key respects. 94 Section 25 of the 1789 Act originally vested
appellate jurisdiction to reverse or modify (only certain) state court
judgments exclusively in the Supreme Court.95 Lower federal courts
borrowed their procedures-but only in actions at law and only until
1938-from their states while at the same time hearing state law claims
'saved to suitors' by the 1789 Act's admiralty provisions.96 (Common
law causes of action in equity and their relationship to Article III have
been embroiled in debate from the beginning.9 7) And, of course, state
courts' hearing of federal claims has yielded a continual stream of incor-
rigible issues.98 All of this (and more) has brought to our "one supreme
Court" continuing debate about the precise value of a federal forum and
of federal supremacy 99-to say nothing of reconciling judgments in a
state law or state procedures," Cappacrt v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 145 (1976), nor, presuma-
bly, on the forum state law's inchoate distinctions between surface and groundwater. See also
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 425-26 (1925) (holding that the United
States, in protection of its sovereign interests in the navigability of the Great Lakes, could restrain
states and municipalities from directing too much flow out of the basin).
92. On federal common law's tangled ties to these other sources of law, see Anthony J. Bel-
lia, Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 825 (2005);
Clark, supra note 85; Clermont, supra note 24, at 5-20; Field, supra note 87, at 883-88; Fletcher,
supra note 84, at 1517-27; Weinberg, supra note 87.
93. See, e.g., United States v. Alpine Land & Res. Co., 697 F.2d 851, 858 (9th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983) (holding that federal district court could serve as appellate fo-
rum to review actions of Nevada's State Engineer in exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over
action initiated by United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1345).
94. See Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a "Unified Judiciary ", 78 TEX. L.
REv. 1513, 1515 (2000). But see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial power shall extend
to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties . j..."). Congress withheld general federal question jurisdiction from the lower federal
courts until 1875. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 28.
95. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005).
96. The adoption of the federal rules in 1938 merged admiralty, law, and equity actions into
one form of action. POSNER, supra note 8, at 47-50.
97. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Article III and the Cause of Action, 89 IOWA L. REv. 777,
782-92 (2004); Kristin A. Collins, "A Considerable Surgical Operation": Article III, Equity, and
Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010).
98. See Henry F. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L.
REv. 489, 508 (1954); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L.
REv. 1128, 1182 (1986). The Court has occasionally held that state procedure must yield to a fed-
eral right. See, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (holding that exhaustion.and notice re-
quirements in state law could not "unnecessary" burden federal claims).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1; Hart, supra note 98.
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system of so many alternative forums. 100
While the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to manage these tensions has
long been both evident and divisive, 10 1 old debts are increasingly com-
ing due. Interstate disputes have presented them in boldest relief. These
controversies have ever been the bedrock case for some federal fo-
rum.10 2 According to a pair of early twentieth-century opinions, the Su-
preme Court's original jurisdiction for suits between two or more states
over shared waters stems from 1789-at least where the states are as-
serting their sovereign interests."0 3 But the Court's federal common law
100. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983). See generally William Baude,
The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807 (2008); Michael Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of
State Courts in the Twenty-First Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335 (2002); Catherine T. Struve, Direct
and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L.
REV. 243 (2003). State law rights, of course, can draw federal protections as such. See, e.g., Stop
the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 560 U.S. 702, 713-14 (2010); Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Kraft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 659-62 (1977). But state
court judgments are generally not to be reviewed in any federal court save one-leaving much to
the Supreme Court's discretion. See ExxonMobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus., 544 U.S. 280, 284-
88 (2005).
101. "The Supremacy Clause and the Appellate Jurisdiction Clause, taken together, offer
'good evidence' that the Supreme Court has hierarchical authority over state courts on matters of
federal law." Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 35 (2009). Yet the structure and reach of the judicial power was more divisive than any-
thing else throughout the framing, ratification, the Judiciary Act of 1789, or since. See ALISON L.
LACROIX, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF AMERICAN FEDERALISM 180-213 (2010).
102. Cf THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 534 (Alexander Hamilton) (calling the existence of a
neutral forum to resolve state-state conflicts "essential to the peace of the union"); GOEBEL, supra
note 9, at 182-95. The argument went beyond neutral forums, of course. Delaware, faltering in
competition with the Port of Philadelphia, vocally supported an enhanced role for Congress over
maritime commerce. See Harold Hancock, Delaware Becomes the First State, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 21, 26 (Patrick T. Conley & John Kaminski eds.,
1988). And the sectional collision sparked by Jay's efforts to conclude the infamous Gardoqui
treaty with Spain seeking commercial privileges in return for foregoing navigation of the Missis-
sippi consumed the Virginia ratification proceedings. See Lance Banning, Sectionalism and the
General Good, in RATIFYING THE CONSTITUTION 261 (Michael Allen Gillespie & Michael Liene-
sch eds., 1989).
103. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 139-40 (1902) (noting sources of Court's juris-
diction and the necessity that the Court fashion unique rules of decision); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 240-42 (1900) (holding that bill for injunction of upstream pollution was in pursuit of
state's sovereign interests and therefore within the Court's original jurisdiction). The Court con-
tinues to regard 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) as both jurisdictional grant and authority to prescribe (equita-
ble) rules of decision for (some) interstate waters cases. See, e.g., Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct.
2502, 2513-14 (2018); Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 377 n.5 (2011) (noting a "lack of
clarity in this area of water law"); Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 317-24 (1984) (deny-
ing Colorado an appropriation of the Vermejo River despite three quarters of the watershed's loca-
tion in Colorado on the basis of the Court's own equitable principles).
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makes this forum-selection pivot increasingly opaque. 10 4 Which cases
actually belong before the Court in its original jurisdiction has grown
deeply uncertain. For example, are interstate aquifers subject to the ju-
risdiction?' 5 And who/what may intervene in such an action? 10 6 A new-
ly declared reserved right to groundwater,0 7 for another example, is but
the outset of a long journey through innumerable controversies over its
relationship to other waters and their allocation. 0 8 A state's attempt to
disclaim its sovereign interest in such waters, similarly, would necessari-
ly touch federal common law's place in that state's law and courts. 10 9
Whether the Supreme Court has original or appellate jurisdiction
over any of these controversies turns on party alignments, timing, and
the precise claims presented-which, in turn, falls to the Court's own
shifting theories of the available rights and remedies.110 And while its
104. See Bellia, supra note 92, at 847-51, 886-901; Clermont, supra note 24, at 28-32; Abbe
Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as "Law" and the Erie Doctrine, 120
YALE L.J. 1898, 1960-68 (2011); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Common
Law, 100 Nw. U. L. REv. 585, 607-09, 631-49 (2006).
105. Compare Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625 (5th Cir. 2009),
cert. denied, 559 U.S. 904 (2010) (holding that Tennessee was necessary and indispensable party
and dismissing diversity action in tort against city alleging injurious groundwater pumping), with
Florida v. Georgia, 138 S. Ct. 2502 (2018) (holding that downstream state had the right to prove
that equitable apportionment of river could redress its injury even without the United States' party
to lawsuit despite its control of the majority of the flow in the river system).
106. See, e.g., South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S. 256, 264-74 (2010) (permitting
intervention by two water users, a bi-state supply organization and an energy utility, in an action
for equitable apportionment).
107. See Agua Calientc Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d
1262, 1267-72 (9th Cir. 2017).
108. See Burke W. Griggs, Interstate Water Litigation in the West: A Fifty-Year Retrospec-
tive, 20 U. DENY. WATER L. REv. 153 (2017). Federal jurisdiction over the journey remains con-
current with state court jurisdiction. See Agua Caliente, 849 F.3d at 1272-73; WRIGHT & KANE,
supra note 87, at 417-18 ("A case 'arising under' federal common law is a federal question case,
and is within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts as such.").
109. See Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 381-84 (1977) (holding that
state law determines state dispositions after statehood); Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Public Inter-
est, 837 P.2d 158, 164-173 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991) (invalidating state statute disclaiming public
trust law on the grounds it was contrary to the public trust doctrine as well as the state's constitu-
tion); cf Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10 (1935) (holding that federal law pre-
vented a federal patent's conveyance of a state's public trust property prior to statehood).
110. Cf Oregon, 429 U.S. at 381-82 (reversing fresh precedent and holding that state prop-
erty law, not federal common law, governs post-statehood dispositions of submerged lands absent
a pre-statchood federal grant). On the same day it announced Erie the Court held that a state law
water right must yield to contrary requirements of an interstate compact. See Hinderlider v. La
Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). The Court famously regarded
Hinderlider as an affirmation of federal common law of interstate waters after Erie. See, e.g., Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105-07, 107 & n.7 (1972). Yet Hinderlider's federal
common law theory of jurisdiction was quickly mooted by the Court's holding that the construe-
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judgments bind the parties,11 ' whether and how the Court's "equitable
discretion" binds Congress, the Executive Branch, and/or nonparties is
becoming deeply uncertain.112
If the Court's finality as to all federal law regardless of dispute' 13
stems largely from the Supremacy Clause,114 the interminable struggles
over that supremacy frame our jurisdictional jams. 115 Admiralty jurisdic-
tion's interface with state law is the more familiar exemplar. 116 The fed-
tion of interstate compacts approved by Congress will, in most circumstances, present a federal
question. See Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 426-28 (1940).
111. See Hinderlider, 304 U.S. at 104-05; cf South Carolina v. North Carolina, 558 U.S.
256, 258-60 (2010) (treating as binding prior precedents on the norms for allowing intervenors in
original jurisdiction actions); Florida, 138 S. Ct. at 2512-13 (noting the Court's equitable power to
"regulate and mould the process" it employs (quoting Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. 66, 98
(1860)). Despite its own convention to the contrary, the Court decided in 1971 that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251 does not vest exclusive original jurisdiction in the Court over all interstate waters cases.
See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chem. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496-99 (1971). Still, the parens patriae stand-
ing distinguishing actions brought by states from private disputes has resisted rigorous formula-
tion. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Interstate Apportionment Revisited, Updated and Restated,
56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381, 390-94 (1988). Finally, the Court rarely misses a chance to urge Con-
gress and the states to fashion compacts or statutory solutions for interstate waters disputes, see
Kansas v. Colorado, 514 U.S. 673, 678 (1995), although the preemptive scope of any such com-
pact or statute must remain a federal question. See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128
(1987); Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208 (Neb. 2017).
112. Cf Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 568 (1983) ("Where Congress has ... exer-
cised its constitutional power over waters, courts have no power to substitute their own notions of
an 'equitable apportionment' for the apportionment chosen by Congress. "'(quoting Arizona v.
California, 373 U.S. 546, 565-66 (1963))); Charles J. Myers, The Colorado River, 19 STAN. L.
REV. 1, 46 (1966) ("The only question for serious debate is whether a congressional apportion-
ment that destroys vested water rights gives the user a fifth amendment claim for compensation"
(citing United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 224 (1956)).).
113. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 474-77; POSNER, supra note 8, at 262-63; WRIGHT
& KANE, supra note 87, at 105; Pfander, supra note 8, at 689-97.
114. Cf Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) ("[T]he interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court ... is the supreme law of the land, and Article VI of the
Constitution makes it of binding effect on the States 'any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any
State to the Contrary notwithstanding."' (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2)).
115. For a powerful synthesis of the textual and historical debates surrounding the Suprema-
cy Clause's meaning, see Monaghan, supra note 20. Whatever consensus there was behind the
Judiciary Act of 1789 (and there was some), see WILLIAM R. CASTO, OLIVER ELLS WORTH AND
THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC 59-76 (1997); GOEBEL, supra note 9, at 458-503,
nothing in Article Ill or the 1789 statutes defined the "final judgment or decree" from lower courts
to which the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction was to attach. See Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469, 472-75 (1975).
116. See generally ROBERTSON, supra note 85. "[1]t is important to note that a great part of
the federal-state choice-of-laws tangle in maritime cases is intimately involved with the notion
that the federal maritime law is in some sense a brooding omnipresence over the sea." Id. at 138;
see also Ernest A. Young, Preemption at Sea, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 273 (1999).
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eral interest in a uniform maritime law" 7 has long accommodated state
law rights and remedies not inconsistent therewith.'1 8 But vexing sec-
ondary issues arise from such a nexus.1 19 Federal law may be needed
simply because the rule cannot be a state's. 12° From there, gap-filling
can easily become chasm-filling. 121 State law has often featured in inter-
state waters disputes by its adoption as federal law. 122 But variance in
those laws then poses hard choice of law questions. 123 The structural in-
terplay of equitable discretion, concurrent jurisdiction, and statutory
change, thus, can keep the relationships at issue perpetually unsettled. 124
117. See, e.g., Chelentis v. Luekenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 384-85 (1918) (holding that
maritime law's remedies for injured seamen are exclusive, whether case is adjudicated in state or
federal court); So. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1917) (holding that the federal mari-
time law preempted inconsistent state workers' compensation statute providing remedy for a long-
shoreman's death on docked vessel's gangway).
118. This means both the federal adjudication of state law claims, see, e.g, Askew v. Amer.
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 741
(1961), and the state adjudication of (most) federal maritime claims. See, e.g., Madruga v. Superi-
or Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954); Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109 (1924).
119. If the "foundation of jurisdiction is physical power," McDonald v. Mabee, 243, U.S.
90, 91 (1917) (Holmes, J.), territorially constrained judgments respecting interstate waters embody
their own kind of paradox. See infra notes 455-64 and accompanying text.
120. See State ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 26-28 (1951) (holding that state law may
not determine validity of state's entrance into a compact governing the pollution of interstate wa-
ters).
121. The supposed filling of interstices has prompted troubling structural questions across
all three types of law mentioned by the Supremacy Clause. Compare Clark, supra note 11, at
1328-72 (reviewing the Constitution's "encumbering" of federal law making, its 'political safe-
guards of federalism,' and the Supremacy Clause's effects as substantive restraints on federal
law's elaboration by courts), with Gluck, supra note 104, at 1968-96 (describing a polyphonic,
"intersystemic" debate about state and federal methodologies in statutory interpretation). See also
Griggs, supra note 108, at 161-90.
122. See, e.g., Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1936) (holding, on the basis of
state law to similar effect, that groundwater pumping is not contrary to appropriative rights in the
basin under adjudication); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (finding from the laws of
the respective states, both of which adhered to forms of prior appropriation, that principles of first-
in-time governed their claims to same river); New York v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 296, 311-13
(1921) (holding that New Jersey's pollution of New York Harbor was not actionable because,
among other reasons, New York law had permitted the exact same pollution).
123. Jurisdiction and choice-of-law have long been reciprocally influential. See Perry Dane,
Vested Rights, Vestedness and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1191 (1987). But the federal interest
in interstate waters dispute resolution is necessarily distinct from any state interests therein. Cf
Dyer, 341 U.S. at 29 ("Where the States themselves are before this Court for the determination of
a controversy between them, neither can determine their rights inter sese, and this Court must pass
upon every question essential to such a determination .. " (quoting Kentucky v. Indiana, 281
U.S. 163, 176-77 (1930))); Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92,
103 (1938) (noting that Colorado decree vesting plaintiffs' water rights under Colorado law could
have no preclusive effect on New Mexico's claims to interstate stream).
124. See Field, supra note 87, at 915-27 (exploring the possibility that Erie had no constitu-
tional-only statutory-grounds and that federal common law can be made as broadly as Con-
2019] DON'T GO IN THE WATER
Of course, the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state court adjudi-
cations of federal (reserved) rights has proven problematic in its own
right.125 Indeed, as the Court's minimalism and flexibility toward federal
claims on waters have become so manifest, 126 considerable attention has
been drawn to the scope of state rules of decision, to various indirect in-
vitations to state courts to declare federal law, 127 and to the debatable
legacy of the Court's overall patterning. 1
28
State law appropriative rights may still be associated with rugged
individualism under "frontier conditions" and the delineation of "legal
rights by courts in the context of a specific dispute."' 129 But this is a fan-
tasy. 3 ' The general stream adjudication, now infamous for its ineffi-
ciency and interminability, 13 1 is by its nature a territorial action. 132 It
arises in a local forum of record, 133 reaching only those claims sited
gress can legislate). Such uncertainties can feed back on to the Congressional powers involved, as
well. See, e.g., Romero v. Int'l Term. Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 372-80 (1959) (holding, 5-4,
that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 's extension of federal court jurisdiction to "civil actions" arising under "the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States" did not embrace claims for relief arising under
maritime law); see infra notes 374-96 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 194-206 and accompanying text.
126. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) ("Our aim is always to secure
a just and equitable apportionment 'without quibbling over formulas' (quoting New Jersey v.
New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931)).). See generally Justin Huber & Sandra Zellmer, The Shal-
lows Where Federal Reserved Water Rights Founder: State Court Derogation of the Winters Doc-
trine, 16 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 261 (2013). On the vertical structural problems inherent in this
minimalism, see Grove, supra note 101.
127. Cf Bellia, supra note 92, at 902-03. "[A] constitutional principle that a state court may
make federal law on the basis of its views of what national policy should be is unsustainable under
the Supremacy Clause." Id. at 902.
128. See Griggs, supra note 108, at 161-65; Jason A. Robison, Wyoming's Big Horn Gen-
eral Stream Adjudication, 15 WYO. L. REV. 243, 285-88 (2015). On the legacy of the Court's sin-
gle most important interstate waters precedent, see Josh Patashnik, Arizona v. California and the
Equitable Apportionment of Interstate Waterways, 56 ARiZ. L. REV. 1 (2014).
129. MacDonnell, supra note 63, at 237. The so-called "Wyoming System" of permitting
withdrawals is the dominant approach today, although even these states have relied on general
stream adjudications and related exercises ofjudicial power. See id. at 308-09.
130. See Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters 11, supra note 18, at 317-24.
131. See, e.g., Joseph M. Feller, The Adjudication That Ate Arizona Water Law, 49 ARIZ. L.
REV. 405 (2007); A. Dan Tarlock, The Illusion of Finality in General Water Rights Adjudications,
25 IDAHO L. REV. 271 (1988).
132. After Erie and Hinderlider, whatever rights its judgments may vest are necessarily
subordinate to the uniquely federal interest in resolving the competing claims of interested states.
See Tobias Barrington Wolff, Choice of Law and Federal Jurisdictional Policy in the Federal
Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1847, 1871-78 (2017).
133. Venue in any forum where property in issue is located, i.e., a "local action," has long
been conventional. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 196 (1977); Mullane v. Cent. Han-
over Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1950); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878).
See generally Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., A General Theory of State Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP.
CT. REV. 241 (1965). It has also been indirectly jurisdictional by barring adjudication wherever
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within the forum state.134 The aim of the proceeding is to resolve the
seniority, location, beneficial use(s), and timing of extant diversions-
and to avoid having a federal court do so. 135 They are often cast as a
kind of quiet title action]36 and, in that, as affording at least a modicum
of repose at completion. 137 But they are usually structured by special
statute as they also require considerable administrative support. 138 And
the validity of any such judgment will inevitably turn on the reasona-
bleness of the forum's exercise of jurisdiction. 139
Beyond the reification of rights for their merely having been to
court,1 40 though, basin adjudications have resolved little. This is in part
because to be a local action at all they must ignore the nature of the res
itself: continuous, dynamic, shared systems prone to change, abuse, and
neglect, the shares of which evade possession-by legal fiction or oth-
erwise. 141 Disputes over entitlements of that kind, their measurement,
and the resulting judgments have yielded a uniquely chaotic jurisdic-
tional landscape, 142 as Part B explains.
the property is not. See Twitchell, supra note 54, at 616-17, 617 & n.28. Despite most aquifers',
rivers', and their tributaries' interstate extents, however, only a small fraction of water rights adju-
dications have ever been explicitly extraterritorial in scope. See infra note 452 and accompanying
text.
134. See Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters, supra note 18, at 359-60. This has meant
for rough handling of interests like Winters rights, see Huber & Zeilmer, supra note 126, and for
confusing treatments of tributaries and groundwater. See Thomas H. Pacheco, How Big Is Big?
The Scope of Water Rights Suits Under the McCarran Amendment, 15 ECOL. L.Q. 627, 632-43
(1988).
135. See Tarlock, supra note 131, at 281-82; Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters H, su-
pra note 18, at 331-37.
136. See, e.g., State Dept. of Ecology v. Grimes, 852 P.2d 1044, 1048 (Wash. 1993). De-
spite this characterization's repeated rejection by commentators and some courts, see Tarlock, su-
pra note 131, at 283, "[t]he assumption that adjudication can create certainty out of inherent un-
certainty" has remained widespread. Id. at 273. In the few claims filed by the United States on
behalf of tribes or other federal reservations, federal courts repeatedly characterized the suits as
quiet title actions. See, e.g., United States v. Ahtanum Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321, 339 (9th Cir. 1954).
137. See Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters 11, supra note 18, at 358-59.
138. See Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 18, at 337-432.
139. See RESTATEMENT (2D) JUDGMENTS § 6 (1982); Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 321
(1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
140. As the Supreme Court held in 1938, the appropriative right decreed in one state has no
necessary force over users in downstream states. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry
Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 103 (1938).
141. Put simply, the double aspect most associated with property, a discrete thing and an
owner's right to exclude others from it, see JAMES PENNER, THE IDEA OF PROPERTY [N LAW 71
(1997), is missing from these adjudications.
142. See Michelle Bryan, At the End of the Day: Are the West's General Stream Adjudica-
tions Relevant to Modern Water Rights Administration?, 15 Wyo. L. REV. 461 (2015); Lawrence
J. MacDonnell, General Stream Adjudications, the McCarran Amendment, and Reserved Water
Rights, 15 WYO. L. REv. 313 (2015).
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B. Erie's Shadow: McCarran, Abstention, and the Federal Forum
In 1952, Nevada Senator Patrick McCarran maneuvered a waiver of
sovereign immunity into a Justice Department appropriations bill, im-
mortalizing himself in this 'McCarran Amendment.'143 That rider per-
mitted the United States to be joined "as a defendant in any suit.., for
the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source." '14 4 McCarran was motivated in largest part by the specter of
tribal reserved rights. 145 Yet only about a dozen state court adjudications
of basins weighing federal reserved rights have been completed.
146
Though just a fraction, 147 they have shown basin proceedings unfit to the
task. 148 If anything, they have further clouded the related rights in both
extent and legal force.
The Supreme Court construed the McCarran Amendment as more
than an immunity waiver, finding in it a federal policy of deferring to
parallel state proceedings. In Colorado River Water Conserv. District v.
United States,149 and again in Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe,
150
majorities of the Court held that a federal trial forum was not necessary
to the adjudication of water claims arising under federal law because any
143. See McElroy & Davis, supra note 18, at 601-05 (discussing enactment of waiver, codi-
fied today at 43 U.S.C. § 666). In its first encounter, the Court held that McCarran's waiver in-
cluded only the "general" stream adjudication-not just any "suit" involving water rights. See
Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1963). Focus soon shifted to the necessary generality of
such an adjudication, see United States v. Dist. Court for the Cty. of Eagle, 401 U.S. 520, 524-25
(1971); United States v. Dist. Court Water Div. No. 5,401 U.S. 527 (1971), and then to the waiv-
er's deeper policy motivations. See infra notes 149-60 and accompanying text.
144. United States v. Idaho, 508 U.S. 1, 3 (1993) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 666).
145. See, e.g., MCCOOL, supra note 82; Robert T. Anderson, Indian Water Rights and the
Federal Trust Responsibility, 46 NAT. RESOURCES J. 399 (2006); David H. Getches, The Unset-
tling of the West: How Indians Got the Best Water Rights, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1473 (2001) (review-
ing JOHN SHURTS, INDIAN RESERVED WATER RIGHTS (2000)); Steven J. Shupe, Water in Indian
Country: From Paper Rights to a Managed Resource, 57 U. COLO. L. REV. 561 (1986).
146. Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters 11, supra note 18. For example, following
United States v. District Court for Eagle County, 401 U.S. 520 (1971), and United States v. Dis-
trict Court in and for Water Division No. 5, 401 U.S. 527 (1971), the Supreme Court of Colorado
adjudicated the reserved rights for seven national forests, three national monuments, Rocky
Mountain National Park, and countless springs and wells on other public lands in the state. See
United States v. City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1982).
147. Cf Anderson, supra note 24, at 213-14 (finding that 27 tribal water rights settlements
had been approved but that some 250 tribes in the contiguous United States have still-unquantified
water rights).
148. See MCCOOL, supra note 82, at 44-50; Anderson, supra note 24, at 209-13 ("[T]his
climate of uncertainty in litigation outcomes can lead tribes and states to forge settlements that
may be approved by Congress.").
149. 424 U.S. 800, 812-18 (1976).
150. 463 U.S. 545, 564 (1983).
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federal interests at stake therein could be adequately protected by state
courts and/or the Supreme Court's own certiorari jurisdiction.151 The
Colorado River Court insisted that this form of federal court abstention
should be rare.152 But its factored analysis'5 3 came to stand for a federal
interest in avoiding "piecemeal litigation." '154 This federal interest has
remained a common refrain ever since. 155
Colorado River began as an extension of Railroad Commission v.
Pullman abstention. 15 6 Both remain staples of federal courts teaching
and scholarship' 57 because they underline the centrality of emergent
state law and state interests to the mysteries of concurrent jurisdiction. 158
But Colorado River has since joined what might be called the Erie can-
on: the separation of jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate and the insistence that the former not be collapsed into the latter. 5 9
151. See San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. at 571 ("State courts, as much as federal courts,
have a solemn obligation to follow federal law. Moreover, any state-court decision alleged to
abridge Indian water rights protected by federal law can expect to receive, if brought for review
before this Court, a particularized and exacting scrutiny commensurate with the powerful federal
interest in safeguarding those rights from state encroachment."); Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 819-
20 (holding that "[o]nly the clearest of justifications" warrant federal courts refusing to exercise
jurisdiction granted them but that abstention in favor of state court was warranted in general
stream adjudication).
152. See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 813; see also Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury
Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 19-29 (1983).
153. The Colorado River Court, after tabulating three separate abstention doctrines, noted
that, ordinarily, abstention can be warranted if: (1) a state court has custody of the property at is-
sue in an in rem action; (2) the federal forum was somehow inconvenient; (3) the desirability of
avoiding piecemeal litigation; and (4) the order in which jurisdiction had been obtained in the
concurrent forum(s). See Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 818-19.
154. Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 19.
155. See Feller, supra note 131.
156. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Pullman directed federal courts to stay their proceedings in defer-
ence to a parallel state proceeding if doing so allowed the state court to resolve state law issues
that could obviate the need for federal adjudication. See Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of
Abstention, 88 MIcH. L. REV. 530, 534-35 & n.20 (1989). Abstention can also avoid a need to cer-
tify state law issues to a state court and hold the federal action in abeyance awaiting an answer.
See Martha A. Field, The Abstention Doctrine Today, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 590, 605-09 (1977).
157. Cf FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 1178 (observing after excerpting the Colorado
River opinions that, apart from two narrow exceptions, "the Court had approved federal deference
to pending state proceedings in only a few instances before Colorado River."). Even those who
accept that federal rights do not always necessitate. a federal trial forum have found Colorado Riv-
er troublesome. Cf Friedman, supra note 156, at 588 ("Perhaps the most intriguing puzzle...
arises in the context of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding so-called Colorado River absten-
tion.").
158. Cf Friedman, supra note 156, at 591-94 (noting that Colorado River abstention is
unique in the posture of two-forum cases with the United States as a party and Congress's implicit
preference for state-court resolution of combined state/federal law claims).
159. See Ely, supra note 88; Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Eric: The
Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974); Roosevelt, supra note 89, at 3-15. An exhaustive study of
2019] DON'T GO IN THE WATER
And that has submerged it deep within old debates about the nature of
law, lawmaking, and our federalism. 
160
As Justice Stevens' dissent argued in San Carlos, McCarran's rider
was no more than an immunity waiver for a particular kind of suit-not
a state forum mandate. 161 Practically speaking, federal adjudication of
reserved water rights need no more disrupt or duplicate concurrent state
proceedings than any other declaratory judgment would. 162 If anything,
experience suggests that having federal claims resolved relatively quick-
ly and separately could be a considerable practical help to water rights
delineation. 163 For when federal reserved rights are adjudicated, subor-
dinate issues invariably arise, leaving the resolution of the law to a de-
ciding forum that lacks the right to settle that law or to refer it to a better
forum. 164 And as other federal common law doctrines have shown in the
Pullman abstention two years before Colorado River cast it as an indirect response to latent state
and Congressional hostility toward the Court's famous "exception" to the Eleventh Amendment's
bar on suits challenging state action in Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See Martha A. Field,
Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 1071, 1074-76 (1974).
160. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 588-634; Ely, supra note 88, at 695. See generally
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA (2000).
161. See San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 573 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. See San Carlos Apache, 463 U.S. at 572-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Professor
Abrams argued shortly after Colorado River, any subsequent litigation in state court would be
bound to give preclusive effect to any federal judgment by the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. VI, much as any federal court litigation would be bound by the full faith andcredit
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. See Robert H. Abrams, Reserved Water Rights, Indian Rights and the
Narrowing Scope of Federal Jurisdiction: The Colorado River Decision, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1111,
1125 & n.91 (1978). Ultimately, "[f]ecleral law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress
has determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that state courts might provide
a more convenient forum-although both might well be true-but because the Constitution and
laws passed pursuant to it are as much laws in the States as laws passed by the state legislature."
Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990).
163. See Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters 11, supra note 18, at 437 ("Of the proceed-
ings reviewed for this article, only Texas may have completed a comprehensive adjudication. The
Texas adjudicators, however, did not have to face the complexity of federal reserved water rights
claims or groundwater."); see also A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT:
A CASEBOOK IN LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY 898-902 (3d ed. 2002).
164. In Colorado, for example, the state supreme court had to resolve as a matter of first im-
pression whether federal reservations of springs and water holes necessarily reserved the "entire
yield" thereof, see City & Cty. of Denver, 656 P.2d at 32-33 (holding they did not), whether "hot"
springs were encompassed within the Pickett Act's or other federal statutes' reservations, id. at
33-34 (holding they were not), and whether the United States must follow Colorado procedures if
it chooses to change points of diversion or future uses. See id. at 35 (holding that it must). See also
In re Yakima River Drainage Basin, 296 P.3d 835, 848-50 (Wash. 2013) (holding that prior feder-
al court consent decree of 1964 was an adjudication and final judgment of certain other users
claims even without quantifying reserved rights); Confd Salish & Kootenai Tribes v. Clinch, 158
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diversity jurisdiction, choices of forum and of law present ample discre-
tion to federal courts guided by Erie's policy aims. 165
The federal interest in avoiding piecemeal adjudication of mostly
state law rights 166 may have squared with the ambitions behind basin ad-
judications. 167 Several states responded to Colorado River by enlarging
their stream proceedings into what. the Court had signaled that McCarran
expected. 168 But the cases soon grew so daunting that tribes and many
private claimants simply took to settling their differences out of court.169
As Professor Tarlock observed decades ago, as modes of dispute resolu-
tion stream adjudications were barely fit to a distant past and completely
unfit for the hand-to-hand combat water law and litigation became. 170
Today, this is a pattern: if judicial proceedings can be avoided, most us-
ers do so. 171
The adjudication of the Big Horn River system and the rights re-
served to Wyoming's Wind River Indian reservation remain the caution-
ary tale. 172 Quantification of the tribal rights reserved in the landmark
P.3d 377, 389 (Mont. 2007) (holding that tribes' still-unquantified reserved water rights do not
preempt state's processing of a change of use application on river system); In re Snake River Ba-
sin Water System, 764 P.2d 78, 83-86 (Idaho 1988) (holding that MeCarran Amendment's terms
apply to basin-wide adjudications, including tributaries); United States v. Bell, 724 P.2d 631, 637-
40 (Colo. 1986) (holding that application to amend reserved rights did not relate back to original
application); State ex rel. Greeley v. Confd. Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 712 P.2d 754, 763-66
(Mont. 1985) (holding that tribe's irrigation priority date could be later than the "time immemori-
al" priority of tribe's in-stream flow claims supporting hunting and fishing rights).
165. See David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 566-70
(1985); Wolff, supra note 132, at 1860-82.
166. Cf Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Costr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (observing
that the decision to abstain "does not rest on a mechanical checklist, but on a careful balancing of
the important factors as they apply" and that, although the "weight to be given to any one factor
may vary greatly from case," "[b]y far the most important factor" is the "clear federal policy...
[of] avoidance of piecemeal adjudication of water rights in a river system").
167. See McElroy & Davis, supra note 18, at 606-12 (describing Colorado's 1969 statutory
reform of its water adjudication system, the United States' obstructionism in a series of Colorado
cases, and Justice Brennan's majority opinion in Colorado River, "without any citation," invoking
the McCarran Amendment's policy of deference even to proceedings like Colorado's month-to-
month adjudications).
168. See MacDonnell, supra note 63, at 309 ("States have initiated general adjudications
primarily to force the federal government and Indian tribes to adjudicate their reserved water
rights claims."); Pacheco, supra note 134, at 635-43.
169. See MCCOOL, supra note 82, at 48; Anderson, supra note 24, at 213; Feller, supra note
131, at 429-33; McElroy & Davis, supra note 18, at 620-23.
170. See Tarlock, supra note 131, at 284; see also Feller, supra note 131.
171. See Bryan, supra note 142, at 509-11; Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters II, su-
pra note 18, at 452-63.
172. See Robison, supra note 128, at 309-12.
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treaties of Fort Bridger quickly overshadowed other issues. 173 The fed-
eral common law tracing to Winters required the courts to interpret the
treaties' purposes. 174 But that common law was skeletal. 175 In fact, for
modes of quantification there was exactly one governing precedent: the
Supreme Court's decision adopting a special master's solution in Arizo-
na v. California. 176 There, the Court held that the Colorado River tribes'
reserved rights should be quantified by reference to the irrigation they
could practicably undertake on their reservations. 177 This "practicably
irrigable acreage" (PIA) standard came to animate the Wyoming pro-
ceedings, much to the appropriators' chagrin. 178 Yet the Wyoming
courts' elaboration of that standard raised more questions than it an-
173. See Anderson, supra note 24, at 209 & nn.63-64. The litigation was commenced in
1977 and came to include more than 20,000 claims-only the first two phases of which pertained
to the tribes' claims stemming from treaties in 1866 and 1868. See In re Big Horn River System,
899 P.2d 848, 850 (Wyo. 1995) (Big Horn i1). The basin adjudication was settled in 2014.
174. Cf Washington v. Wash. State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658,
675 (1979) ("[l]t is the intention of the parties, and not solely that of the superior side, that must
control any attempt to interpret the treaties. When Indians are involved, this Court has long given
special meaning to this rule."); United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 700 & n.4 (1978)
(noting that the Court's applications of the Winters doctrine were the sources of authority for
qluantifying a national forest's reserved water rights).
175. In the Ninth Circuit, for example, most tribal rights "necessarily carry a priority date of
time immemorial." United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Colville
Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Ahtanum lrr.
Dist. 236 F.2d 321, 326 (9th Cir. 1956); Skeem v. United States, 273 F. 93, 95 (9th Cir. 1921).
The Washington Supreme Court agreed in In re Yakima River Drainage Basin, 296 P.3d 835, 840
(Wash. 2013). In In re Big Horn River System, 753 P.2d 76 (Wyo. 1988) (Big Horn 11), the Wyo-
ming Supreme Court purported to follow Adair and Walton while ignoring their true holdings,
fixing the priority date as that of the later Fort Bridger treaty based solely on the United States'
purposes. See id. at 112.
176. 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Tellingly, that court was called upon to interpret federal statutes
authorizing the major storage projects on the lower Colorado (the Boulder Canyon Act among
them) and the alleged statutory allocations to the lower-basin states. See id. at 564-66. Within that
task, the quantification of the five mainstem tribes' reserved water rights further embedded the
litigants (and Special Master Rilkind) in a struggle to find a fair, workable standard. Id. at 599-
601. The Arizona Court adopted Rifkind's test, id., arguably making it federal common law. See
Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1983).
177. See 373 U.S. at 601 ("How many Indians there will be and what their future needs will
be can only be guessed. We have concluded, as did the Master, that the only feasible and fair way
by which reserved water for the reservations can be measured is irrigable acreage."). When the
Supreme Court was later invited to "balance" Indian needs for water against other claimants'
needs it refused to do so, citing the PIA standard as a bar to equitable interest balancing. See Ari-
zona v. California, 460 U.S. 605, 616 (1983).
178. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of Wyoming, Wyoming v.
United States, 1988 WL 1094117 (Aug. 19, 1988), at 24 (arguing that the Wyoming Supreme
Court's award using the PIA standard constituted a "windfall" to the tribes lacking "any evidence
showing that the ... water was essential to meet the minimum needs of the Reservation or to ac-
complish its agricultural purpose") [hereinafter Wyoming Cert. Petition].
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swered. A certiorari petition followed' 7 9 from which a monument to ju-
risdictional muddles emerged. 180
The history of publicly financed irrigation works of dubious value,
let alone those undertaken for nomadic peoples whose purposes had so
diverged from the United States', has rarely appeared in the general
stream adjudications. 18' That history tied Wind River irrigation over the
preceding century to what might still be irrigated in a future with com-
mitted federal support. 18 2 It highlighted both the tribes' long-standing
predicament (a lack of economic opportunity in central Wyoming' 83)
and the PIA standard's anachronistic focus on a development strategy
that had failed most places it had been tried.'84 Yet the Wyoming courts
179. See Wyoming v. United States, 488 U.S. 1040 (1989) (granting petition in part). An
equally divided court affirmed the Wyoming Supreme Court in Wyoming v. United States, 492
U.S. 406 (1989).
180. See Big Horn 111, 835 P.3d at 275-78; see also Andrew C. Mergen & Sylvia F. Liu, A
Misplaced Sensitivity: The Draft Opinions in Wyoming v. United States, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 683
(1997).
181. See MCCOOL, supra note 82; Sylvia F. Liu, American Indian Reserved Water Rights:
The Federal Obligation to Protect Tribal Water Resources and Tribal Autonomy, 25 ENVTL. L.
425, 434-37, 442-52 (1995); Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 698-702. But cf United States v.
Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 111, 111-15 (1938) (describing the history of settlement, for-
cible resettlement of Arapahoe tribes, cessions, and economic distress on the reservation in litiga-
tion surrounding just compensation to tribes for land taken by United States). In Big Horn 11, the
Wyoming Supreme Court referred to this history as one of the tribes' "economic misfortunes,"
none of which were attributed to White settlers or to the United States. See In re Big Horn River
System, 753 P.2d 76, 84 (Big Horn I1).
182. See MCCOOL, supra note 82, at 19-23. After holding that the Ft. Bridger treaties' sole
purpose was to convert the tribes to a pastoral existence, the Wyoming Supreme Court concluded
in Big Horn I that groundwater formed no part of their reserved rights. See Big Horn 1I, 753 P.2d
at 99-100. The court cited only the opinion of a district court sitting in diversity which had held
that past "need and use" were the touchstones of reserved rights-not Congressional or tribal pur-
poses. See id. at 99 (discussing Tweedy v. Texas Co., 286 F. Supp. 383 (D. Mont. 1968)).
183. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 716-20 (showing the tension between any argu-
ments against tribal surpluses and the tribes' long-term best interests). As has long been noted of
the PIA standard, tribal economic opportunities and autonomy are hardly advanced in most cases
by rights to irrigation water. See, e.g., Martha C. Franks, The Uses of the Practicably Irrigable
Acreage Standard in the Quantification of Reserved Water Rights, 31 NAT. RES. J. 549, 562-83
(1991).
184. The state's argument to the Supreme Court was that the Indians had made so little use
of the diversions constructed throughout the twentieth century that a decree should include no fur-
ther allocation. See Wyoming Petition, supra note 178, at 18-26; cf Franks, supra note 183, at 583
("A PIA court is asked to make an all-or-nothing decision on the feasibility of irrigation projects.
Generally, it is not possible to justify the feasibility of some portion of a project .... Thus, either
the whole project is feasible or it is not."); David M. Stanton, Note-Is There a Reserved Water
Right for Wildlife on the Wind River Indian Reservation? A Critical Analysis of the Big Horn Riv-
er General Adjudication, 35 S.D.L. REV. 326, 335-40 (1990) (critiquing the Special Master's Re-
port and the Big Horn H opinion for ignoring extrinsic evidence and the texts of the treaties sug-
gesting a reservation of in-stream flows for fish and wildlife was among the parties' purposes).
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seemed predisposed to reject what the tribes and many others already
knew: water for instream flows protecting the ecosystem can be more
valuable than more irrigation. 18 5 They denied the tribes a right to
groundwater.' 86 Seemingly unable to update federal common law, 187 the
Wyoming courts simply ignored the argument that the Fort Bridger trea-
ties' broader purposes, i.e., to establish a "permanent home," 188 to "pro-
vide a homeland," '189 or help to create a "pastoral and civilized peo-
ple,"190 urged the consideration of new uses. 191
A fair question is whether original jurisdiction in a federal forum
would have changed that. 192 Most observers contend that neutral federal
185. See MCCOOL, supra note 82, at 149-51; Franks, supra note 183, at 563-83. Compare
Bighorn 11, 753 P.2d at 98-99 (denying four of five proposed uses because of treaty's supposed
"sole agricultural purpose"), with in re Bighorn River System, 803 P.2d 61, 70 (Wyo. 1990) (Big-
horn III) (holding that both Indians and successors-in-interest to Indian allotment purchasers alike
should have their rights quantified by irrigable acreage standard). On the monetizable ecosystem
services of a river like the Big Horn, see J.B. RUHL ET AL., THE LAW AND POLICY OF ECOSYSTEM
SERVICES 205-12 (2007).
186. See Big Horn l, 753 P.2d at 99-100.
187. Inferior courts have often narrowed or updated Supreme Court precedents in other con-
texts. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Supreme Court Precedent from Below, 104 GEO. L.J. 921
(2016). The Arizona Supreme Court, for example, held that Arizona had not established the PIA
standard as the sole, uniquely correct means of quantifying reserved rights. See In re Gila River
System and Source, 35 P.3d 68, 77-78 (Ariz. 2001). The Supreme Court itself can do it more effi-
ciently. See Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV.
1861 (2014).
188. Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Coachella Valley Water Dist., 849 F.3d
1262, 1270 (9th Cir. 2017) ("[W]hile we are unable to find controlling federal appellate authority
explicitly holding that the Winters doctrine applies to groundwater, we now expressly hold that it
does.").
189. Colville Confederated Tribes v. Walton, 647 F.2d 42, 47 (9th Cir. 1981) ("We are
mindful that the reservation was created for the Indians, not for the benefit of the government....
We also consider their need to maintain themselves under changed circumstances.").
190. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 575 (1908).
191. Cf Big Horn 11, 753 P.2d at 96 (noting a lack of authority for using the "specific pur-
pose test" to limit Indian reserved water rights to a "sole agricultural purpose," that the Special
Master's interpretation was not a finding of fact while affirming the application of the PIA stand-
ard and nothing more). The state still argued that the Big Horn Ii court had "granted a reserved
water right 72% greater than the water needed by the Tribes after eighty years of extensive irriga-
tion development.. .. " Wyoming Petition, supra note 178, at 25-26.
192. Commentary at the time took exception with the Wyoming courts' understanding of the
treaties' purposes. See Franks, supra note 183, at 563-67; Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 702 &
n.133; Stanton, supra note 184. Interpreting Winters's purposes standard had already been conten-
tious, though. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 718-19 (1978) (Powell, J.,
joined by Brennan, White, Marshall, dissenting) (rejecting the majority's narrowing construction
of Gila National Forest's establishment purposes). Nevertheless, the Big Horn opinions cut a stark
contrast with the federal courts' interpretation of the Klamath Indian tribes' treaty purposes. See
United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1397-1400 (9th Cir. 1984).
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forums exist for precisely this type of case. 193 And in the only certiorari
grant involving a basin adjudication of Winters rights since Colorado
River or San Carlos, the U.S. Supreme Court came to the brink of vacat-
ing the Wyoming decision. 194 The Wyoming courts had combined his-
torically irrigated acres with acres "susceptible to sustained irrigation at
reasonable costs,"1 95 a move a majority of the Supreme Court concluded
had been insufficiently sensitive to non-Indian users in the basin.' 96 Jus-
tice O'Connor's last-minute recusal left the Court equally divided,
though, affirming the result below by rule.' 97 Vital questions like wheth-
er and how the tribes could change uses, market excess water, or forfeit
it, were never addressed. 98 For these and other issues, the combination
of a state forum and federal common law brought only confusion' 99 and
debates over judges' 'finding' rather than making the law.2 0
193. See MacDonnell, supra note 63, at 342-44; McElroy & Davis, supra note 18, at 624-
28, 648; Robison, supra note 128, at 270-77; Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters 11, supra
note 18, at 470.
194. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 684-85. A draft opinion by Justice O'Connor
was based in substantial part on Wyoming's brief. Id.
195. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 700-01. That aspect of the award below was af-
firmed by the Wyoming Supreme Court. See Big Horn IH, 753 P.2d at 102 (applying an abuse of
discretion standard). But it also approved of the lower court's rejection of the special master's in-
terpretation of the treaties as having additional purposes besides irrigation. Cf id. at 97 ("Alt-
hough the treaty did not force the Indians to become farmers and although it clearly contemplates
that other activities would be permitted ... the treaty encouraged only agriculture, and that was its
primary purpose.").
196. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 707-08; Robison, supra note 128, at 286-88.
197. Cf Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 735-40 (appendix) (reprinting Justice O'Connor's
draft opinion showing a "factored" approach to PIA, together with a new "sensitivity" factor limit-
ing quantifies for Indians to that which is needed and not too injurious to other users in the basin).
198. See Mergen & Liu, supra note 180, at 702-05, 740; Robison, supra note 128, at 293.
On remand, the change-of-use issue (along with another, less precise question) re-emerged, draw-
ing a fractious and "confusing" response from the Wyoming Supreme Court in Big Horn IV. See
MCCOOL, supra note 82, at 19; Robison, supra note 128, at 290.
199. Big Horn IVs 3-2 majority agreed to reverse the lower court's holding that the tribes
could change uses without state approval but failed to agree on the extent of the state engineer's
authority over the tribes' reserved rights generally. See Big Horn IV 835 P.2d at 300-03 (Golden,
J., dissenting) (offering a "guide" to the plurality of opinions and disparate rationales behind the
votes to reverse); Robison, supra note 128, at 290-91.
200. Cf PURCELL, supra note 160, at 303 (noting that Justice Brandeis was concerned with
limiting federal common law-making but that Erie never resolved the proper scope of that power).
As to federal courts, "[m]ost theories fall into two categories: (1) those that argue that federal
courts have inherent power to make federal common law in certain circumstances; and (2) those
that argue that federal courts have power to make federal common law only if Congress has dele-
gated power to them to do so." Bellia, supra note 92, at 827. But for state courts, they "could no
more comply with a command that they adjudicate claims arising under federal law but make no
new federal law with respect to them than they could comply with a command that they both de-
cide a case and not decide it." Id. at 830. Thus, so long as state courts are bound to adjudicate fed-
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What was finally settled about the water rights in the Big Horn adju-
dication? Presumably Wyoming could change the state law rights there
declared, but what of the federal law declared? 2 1' And what in the
judgment was federal law-the interpretation of the Ft. Bridger trea-
ties? 2° 2 The denial of groundwater rights? 203 The PIA standard's Janus-
faced application to that reservation? 204 A federal court convinced the
Big Horn opinions were' wrong on any of this would rightly reject
them.2 5 But what about a later state court? That contingency arose three
years later when the Wyoming Supreme Court could not form a majority
on the quite practical question of whether the state's change-of-use con-
straints applied to tribal applicants.
20 6
Several considerations diminish the value of a judgment where the
federal common law of waters' uncertain contours were traced in a state
forum.20 7 First, state courts are not constrained in their resolution of fed-
eral claims, see, e.g., Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 151 (1988), state court adjudication of re-
served rights will present 'reverse-Erie' problems.
201. Cf Bellia, supra note 92, at 908 ("[W]hen a state court purports to enforce the 'su-
preme Law of the Land,' it must seek to enforce its best understanding of existing principles of
federal law."); Clermont, supra note 24, at 57 ("[E]very question of law posed to every actor in a
system of federalism is preceded by the choice-of-law problem of whether the legal question is a
matter of state or federal law, a problem whose resolution is usually obvious but sometimes ex-
cruciatingly difficult."); Field, supra note 87, at 927 ("The cases rarely address directly the courts'
power to make federal common law .... The case law creates the overall impression that courts'
power to create federal rules is less broad than Congress's power, but no clear picture emerges of
the limits of federal common law.").
202. See supra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
203. Some state high courts have distinguished the Big Horn ruling. See In re Gila River
System, 989 P.2d 739, 745 (Ariz. 1999); Confd Salish and Kootenai Tribes v. Stults, 59 P.3d
1093, 1094 (Mont. 2002).
204. The Court's adoption of the Special Master's PIA solution in Arizona v. California,
373 U.S. 546, 600-01 (1963), was notoriously back-handed and cryptic, see Myers, supra note
112, at 71, and has since been rejected by at least one state court. See In re Gila River System, 35
P.3d 68, 77-79 (Ariz. 2001).
205. See Kevin M. Clermont, Degrees of Deference: Applying vs. Adopting Another Sover-
eign's Law, 103 CORNELL L. REv. 243, 273 (2018) ("A state court's decision as to the content of
federal law ... has no precedential effect at all in federal court."); cf Baude, supra note 100, at
1844 ("Judgments become binding law, not opinions. Opinions merely explain the grounds for
judgments, helping other people to plan and order their affairs.") (emphasis in original).
206. See Big Horn IV, 835 P.2d at 300-03 (Golden, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority
on each of two points of reversal included at least one judge who disagreed with the rationale for
the reversal) ("At least three Justices ... conclude that the state engineer should regulate the water
on the entire reservation, but the law that should applied is federal, not state law .... Pragmatical-
ly, it is difficult to imagine how this opinion can be implemented.").
207. Cf Clermont, supra note 205, at 274-75 (noting that application of federal law by state
court calls for "pretty blind adherence by the state actor to the federal government's views of that
law's content" but that "state interests control any adoption of federal law" and that state courts
would "tend to be bound under stare decisis by decisions within that state's hierarchy of courts as
to the federal law's content").
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eral claims by Article III, although any federal court review thereof must
be.218 Second, the stream adjudications are by nature "preventive" and,
because of how fact intensive they are, of quite uncertain preclusive
scope. 20 9 Finally, "there is no obvious line distinguishing judicial acts
that make federal common law from judicial acts that merely apply
preexisting federal law." 21° This can be especially problematic when an
elected judiciary duty-bound to serve the state's interests is interpreting
reserved rights to waters.211 So what is the binding effect of any of these
judgments? The Indians' antagonists in Wyoming insisted that any more
water ceded to the tribes would come from them 'gallon-for-gallon,' 212
and that federal law did not command that the tribes be granted instream
flows.213 Yet federal common law was (and is) settled that Indian treaty
purposes are necessarily bilateral and that tribal rights were not created
by those treaties but rather retained therein. 214 The Wyoming courts'
judgments were, in short, incomplete at best and likely questionable on
their merits. And that should prompt a deeper reckoning: can judgments
like these ever actually refine or harden legal entitlements to Western
waters?
208. See Asarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). Even when adjudicating a federal
claim, state courts often play roles vastly different from those of federal courts. See Helen
Hershkoff, State Courts and the "Passive Virtues": Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV.
L. REV. 1833, 1842-76 (2001).
209. See Samuel L. Bray, Preventive Adjudication, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1279, 1295-96
(2010) (defining "preventive adjudication" as litigants seeking "to avoid future harm by having a
court resolve legal indeterminacy without issuing a command" and noting that those resolving
"fact-based indeterminacy" generally have less issue-preclusive effect").
210. Bellia, supra note 92, at 835.
211. See Hershkoff, supra note 208, at 1882-1905; ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF
AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 283-301 (2009). "State courts are not simply "little" versions
of the federal courts. A large majority of state judges face the electorate in either partisan, nonpar-
tisan, or merit-retention elections." WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
285. See also Burt Neubome, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1120-21 (1977). Of
course, raising questions of bias (or relative competence) has always been easier than answering
them. See Michael E. Solimine, The Future of Parity, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1457, 1462-72
(2005).
212. See Wyoming Cert. Petition, supra note 178, at 20-23; cf United States v. New Mexi-
co, 438 U.S. 696, 705 (1978) (observing that federal reserved water rights "will frequently require
a gallon-for-gallon reduction in the amount of water available for water-needy state and private
appropriators").
213. See Wyoming Cert. Petition, supra note 178, at 12-28; Brief for Petitioner, State of
Wyoming v. United States, 1989 WL 1127591 (March 9, 1989), at 10-16.
214. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 379-84 (1905); see also Brief for the Unit-
ed States, State of Wyoming v. United States, 1989 WL 1127611 (April 12, 1989), at 8-11; Wash-
ington v. Wash. State Comm. Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979); Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942); Scufert Bros. Co. v. United States, 249 U.S. 194, 198-
99 (1919).
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Concurrent jurisdiction, as framed by Colorado River abstention 2 15
and San Carlos Apache's faith in the certiorari power,216 is leaving re-
served rights in a permanently unsettled legal state. This indirectly
clouds related appropriative rights too. The Big Horn River, a tributary
of the Yellowstone-itself tributary to the Missouri-is part of a large,
interconnected system that changes abruptly and routinely in character,
extent, and value.217 Federal and state interests in its governance no
doubt converge at points. But they frame and meet aridity's challenges
with inevitably different sovereign and proprietary priorities. 218 Legal
judgments can create little repose in a context like this.
2 19
Of course, PIA is at least a standard.220 "Despite the hundreds of
treaties establishing, enlarging, and diminishing Indian land reserva-
tions, which rarely mention water, Congress as a general matter has said
even less than the Supreme Court on the subject of Indian reserved water
rights." '221 Legal uncertainty in tribal authority has rarely been remedied
by Congress. 222 But these challenges are sure to grow still more acute in
the inevitable preclusion and finality disputes that will trail the basin
judgments into a future of widening scarcity.223 Can these judgments
215. See supra note 149-60 and accompanying text.
216. The Court's certiorari docket necessarily consists in a small (and dwindling) fraction of
cases within its jurisdiction. Simple error correction, thus, has long been thought an ineffective use
of the Court's resources. See SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME
COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROCESS 95 (1986). San Car-
los Apache's faith in the certiorari power to protect specific tribal rights was, thus, curious to say
the least.
217. See DONALD WORSTER, RIVERS OF EMPIRE: WATER, ARIDITY, AND THE GROWTH OF
THE AMERICAN WEST 267-69 (1985).
218. Even stream adjudications of tributaries, like that of the Gila which excluded ground-
water and all downstream consequences, have grown to epic proportions and complexity. See
Feller, supra note 131, at 405; Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters II, supra note 18, at 348-
50.
219. Even assuming defensible judgments can be reached, inter-branch frictions will inevi-
tably engulf them. See Baude, supra note 100, at 1832-34; Kevin C. Walsh, Judicial Departmen-
talism: An Introduction, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1713 (2018).
220. Several lower court opinions quantifying reserved rights by way of irrigability pre-
dated Special Master Rifkind's report in Arizona v. California. See, e.g., United States v. Ahtanum
Irr. Dist., 236 F.2d 321 (9th Cir. 1956); Conrad Invest. Co. v. United States, 161 F. 829 (9th Cir.
1908). Arizona was the Supreme Court's first adoption of PIA.
221. Anderson, supra note 145, at 1153.
222. See LLOYD BURTON, AMERICAN INDIAN WATER RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF LAW
(1991); MCCOOL, supra note 82, at 187-91; Anderson, supra note 24, at 213-14.
223. See, e.g., In re Gila River System and Source, 127 P.3d 882, 886-87 & n.5 (Ariz. 2006)
(describing six distinct issues on preclusive effect of federal consent decree as to tribes not party
to underlying action); In re Yakima River Drainage Basin, 296 P.3d 835, 837-59 (Wash. 2013)
(weighing the preclusive scope of a fifty year-old federal court decree that raised but did not adju-
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bind others not party to them? Should federal or state preclusion law
govern subsequent litigation of reserved or appropriative rights that limit
one another?22 4 What is the force of one of these judgments in a federal
court? 2 2 5 Article III court judgments may (generally) be immune from
legislative revision,226 but some states' judicial powers are less fully in-
dependent of their legislatures. 227 Does that render these judgments even
less secure?
The specter of preclusion law, of course, amplified the incentives to
litigate in the basin adjudications. 228 Going forward it will plague any
assertion of new uses that should (or could) have been raised in those
adjudications. 229 In this light, though, the judgments themselves may
scarcely avoid attack long enough to have been worth their cost.230 Any
judgment is vulnerable to collateral attack under the right (change of)
conditions. 231 Judgments adjudicating title to a thing with cryptic territo-
dicate tribal water rights, reported at United States v. Ahtanum, 330 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1964));
Dept. of Ecology v. Yakima Reserv. Irr. Dist., 850 P.2d 1306 (Wash. 1993).
224. Thus, although the Court has held that "nonmutual offensive" collateral estoppel ordi-
narily will not bind the United States, see United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1984),
the federal full faith and credit statute ordinarily will bind a federal court to the extent state courts
are bound by their own preclusion rules. See Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982)
(citing 28 U.S.C. § 1738); Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 78-79
(1984). Still, the scope of the claims for relief underlying such judgments and their preclusive
force are open to interpretation. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 130 (1983) ("Defini-
tions of what constitutes the 'same cause of action' have not remained static over time.").
225. The full faith and credit statute bars a state court loser from refiling in federal court, but
certain jurisdictional statutes have acquired their own more specific preclusion doctrines. See
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373-80 (1996); Marrese v. Amer. Acad. of
Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379-86 (1985); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96
(1980).
226. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995); United States v. Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 402-16 (1980). The Supreme Court's equitable apportionment judgments
may be an exception, see supra note 104 and accompanying text, although that has not been
squarely tested in court. See Douglas L. Grant & Brett Birdsong, Apportionment by Congress, in
WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 47.01 (3d ed. 2017).
227. See WILLIAMS, supra note 211, at 298-301.
228. See Feller, supra note 131, at 431-32; Tarlock, supra note 131, at 282-88; Thorson et
al., Dividing Western Waters 11, supra note 18, at 436-38.
229. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 530 U.S. 392 (2000); In re Yakima River Drainage Ba-
sin, 296 P.3d 835 (Wash. 2013).
230. Rough estimates put the Big Horn adjudication in the hundreds of millions in total cost.
See Robison, supra note 128, at 309 n.443. Although the Court added in a footnote in Nevada that
"[t]he policies advanced by the doctrine of res judicata perhaps are at their zenith in cases con-
cerning real property, land and water," Nevada, 463 U.S. at 129-30 n. 10, it showed no awareness
of that policy's emergence from real property's possessory nature. See James Y. Stem, Property,
Exclusivity, and Jurisdiction, 100 VA. L. REv. 111, 120-21 (2014).
231. See RESTATEMENT (2d) JUDGMENTS § 73, cmt. b (1982) ("When an unforeseen or un-
controllable interaction occurs between the judgment obligor and the surrounding circumstances,
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riality,232 where notice is not provided to nonresident users,233 and
where the forum applied another sovereign's law, 234 will be open to
those attacks. 235 As fast-changing environments undermine whatever re-
pose these judgments did offer,231 increasing pressures to reallocate wa-
ters as best uses evolve technologically or culturally will challenge our
obsession with protecting private rights from public expropriation. Part
III introduces that dimension to our jurisdictional calculus.
III. WATER RIGHTS TAKINGS: CLAIMS WITHOUT A FORUM?
The Supreme Court has struggled without obvious success to pattern
the doctrinal and jurisdictional norms governing complaints that some
government entity has "taken" property by regulating, damaging, or in-
terfering with it.231 Periods of relative settlement 238 have been quickly
the balance between burden and benefit can be disturbed. If the disturbance assumes substantial
proportion, redress by modification may be appropriate.").
232. River systems as integrated wholes may defy categorization by situs versus non-situs
states, but every Western state is both up- and downstream of another. Cf Alfred P. Hill, The Ju-
dicial Function in Choice of Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1585, 1628-29 (1985) ("The situs jurisdic-
tion can normally protect itself.., by reason of its physical power over local immovables, putting
aside the vexing problem of the deference due to foreign judgments. In any event, these are mat-
ters in which all jurisdictions have a stake, for the non-situs forum of today may be the non-forum
situs of tomorrow."); Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1027-29 (1983) (holding that Idaho has an
interest in the anadromous fish runs of the Snake River that may be protected by equitable appor-
tionment).
233. Cf Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 317-20 (1950) (hold-
ing that due process entails more than "constructive notice" in adjudicating nonresidents' rights to
a resident property).
234. A federal court sitting in diversity may not abstain simply because the state law issues
in its case are unsettled. See Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 234 (1943). And a state
court may, on occasion, be compelled to take jurisdiction of an action involving another state's
law. See, e.g., Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 611 (1951). But a foreign jurisdiction's equity de-
cree effectuating a third jurisdiction's law (the federal common law of reserved rights) surely pre-
sents abundant opportunities to a second forum state to refuse enforcement. See RESTATEMENT
(2D) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 99 (1971) ("The local law of the forum determines the methods by
which a judgment of another state is enforced."); Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222,
235 (1998) ("Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied enforcement in a sister
State when they purported to accomplish an official act within the exclusive province of that other
State or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had no authority.").
235. See infra notes 452-64 and accompanying text.
236. See Tarlock, supra note 131, at 286-88.
237. The canon of this struggle now includes Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management
District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013), Horne v. Department of Agriculture, 569 U.S. 513 (2013), San
Remo Hotel, L.P. v. San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at
Monterey, 526 U.S. 687 (1999), City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S.
156 (1997); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission., 483 U.S. 825 (1987), MacDonald, Som-
mer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986), Williamson County Planning Commission v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450
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overrun by renewed turmoil.2 39 As often as the Court has insisted that
state law takings claims ordinarily belong in state forums, 24 1 it has re-
peatedly qualified the norm. 24 1 The confusion stems in part from proper-
ty as a constitutional concept.242 But it is also among the clearest reflec-
tions of our divided sovereignty and its uncertain significance to
concurrent jurisdiction. As several contentious disputes have lately
shown, when the property claim being asserted is a water right the struc-
ture of the entitlement itself can confound even the best efforts at an ad-
judication. Section A sets the baseline while Section B traces water
rights' special troubles.
A. Denominators and Dual Sovereignty in Constitutional Property
Regulatory takings doctrine for our purposes begins at Justice Bren-
nan's synthesis in Penn Central Transportation v. City of New York. 2 43
Bolstered by scholars, 244 the justices all agreed that property regulation
can become so burdensome as to justify compensation.245 Beyond this
proto-utilitarian turn (challenging in its own right 246 ), though, the major-
ity invoked the "character" of governmental action, contrasting "physi-
cal invasion[s]" like flooding or overflights with taxes, fees, and other
purely pecuniary burdens.247 Where the latter receded into the ocean of
U.S. 621 (1981), Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980), Penn Central Transportation Co.
v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), and Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance
Corps., 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
238. In Lingle v. Chevron, 544 U.S. 528 (2005), Court held that any challenge to a regula-
tion's purpose or efficiency was not a proper "takings" claim (if anything, it was a due process
claim) and that the only takings claim for which federal courts could properly entertain jurisdic-
tion required that a claimant first establish just what "compensation" was due and denied. See id.
at 536-48.
239. See infra note 262 and accompanying text.
240. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260-63; Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186; San Remo Hotel,
545 U.S. at 346-48.
241. See Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630,
1660-63 (2015).
242. See Stewart E. Sterk, The Federalist Dimension of Regulatory Jurisprudence, 114
YALE L.J. 203 (2004).
243. 438 U.S. 104, 122-38 (1978).
244. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-28 (discussing Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility
and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation " Law, 80 HARV. L.
REV. 1165 (1967); Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964)).
245. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 127-28 (fitting within one of "several factors that have
particular significance" whether a regulation "so frustrate[s] distinct investment-backed expecta-
tions" that it becomes a taking).
246. See infra note 253 and accompanying text.
247. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124-25.
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"economic" regulation not to be closely scrutinized,248 physical inva-
sions became a discrete hallmark of regulatory takings.24 9 Likewise,
weighing the burdens on owners became a "whole parcel analysis" of
the sum total of a property's burdens and offsetting benefits.
250
On both the unfair burden and physical invasion tracks, jurisdiction
quickly became a central question.251 Conceptually, both inquiries must
proceed from a baseline:, whether the property at stake included the enti-
tlement which the intervention is alleged to have appropriated or denied.
Land use cases had presented variants of this denominator question be-
fore Penn Central.252 But in Penn Central's wake it became essential.253
It is at least presumptively an inquiry into the law vesting the entitle-
ment(s) at issue254 and distinguishing procedural and remedial dimen-
248. See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine and Its Impact
on Economic Legislation, 76 B.U. L. REV. 605 (1996); Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark:
Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L.
REV. 91 (1995); cf JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 14-15 (1980) (observing that "substantive due process" scrutiny of economic and social
legislation was "universally acknowledged to have been constitutionally improper"). Mostly. In
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013), the Court held that an
"exacted" development fee can, in some contexts, merit elevated scrutiny. See id. at 613-19.
249. See Arkansas Game and Fish Comm'n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23, 31-38 (2012);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-36 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179-80
(1979); DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 94-99 (2002).
250. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 249, at 121-64. An exception to Penn Central's
"whole parcel" analysis was made for the rare regulation that eliminates "all economically viable"
uses of property. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (holding that
such regulations are "per se" takings).
251. For state court claims brought to the Supreme Court by certiorari, the Court is statutori-
ly barred from hearing claims absent a "final" order or disposition-a bar that figured prominently
in several key cases. See San Diego Gas & Elect. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 633
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1257). For federal courts, the Tucker
Act and ripeness principles combine to exclude most takings claims from the district courts. See
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n., 452 U.S. 264 (1981); Penn Central, 438
U.S. 137-38 (concluding that transferable development rights, though they may not have consti-
tuted just compensation if a taking had occurred, nonetheless "mitigate whatever financial burden
the law has imposed on appellants" and for that reason render the final burden impossible to cal-
culate).
252. See Kenneth B. Bley & Tina R. Axlerad, The Search for Constitutionally Protected
"Property" in Land-Use Law, 29 URB. LAW. 251 (1997); Oswald, supra note 248,.at 99-101.
253. Often referred to as the "denominator problem" casting what was possessed (y) versus
what was taken (x) as the integers of an arithmetic fraction-regardless of numeraire-where the
nearer x/y comes to I the greater the probability of a taking, the construct forces courts to adopt
either a subjective or an objective approach toy. See Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369 (1993); John E. Fee,
Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Takings Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535 (1994).
254. See Jamison E. Colburn, Splitting the Atom of Property: Rights Experimentalism as
Obligation to Future Generations, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1411, 1415-39 (2009); cf Board of
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sions therein brings complex choice of law and forum issues. 255 For if
some ostensible burden may still be invalidated, nullified, or mitigated
by some other forum's judgment that could temper or even dispose of
the claim itself.2 56
If a state adjudication resolves a federal claim,257 though, our feder-
alism's full faith and credit requirements should preclude re-litigation of
that very claim.25 8 A core case in full faith and credit is the state court
judgment-loser suing in federal court.259 Yet for property burdens
grounded in state law and challenged in state court, the "virtually un-
flagging obligation of the federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given
them" 260 would then consist solely in the Supreme Court's review by
certiorari.261 There would be no original jurisdiction in a federal forum
and the chances of appellate review would be slim.
Regents v. Roth, 408 U:S. 564, 576-78 (1972) (conceiving of property as being vested by one
source of law and burdened or impaired by other(s)). Although the American founders' under-
standing of property was quite different from ours, it was widely understood that property's ulti-
mate origins were in positive law. See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 249, at 9-25.
255. See Bley & Axelrad, supra note 252, at 271-73 (noting that a local government could
elect to make all use rights discretionary with the government and thereby insulate itself from tak-
ings liability or at least eliminate a federal forum). Compare Williamson County Regional Plan-
ning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985) ("[A] claim that the application of
government regulations effects a taking of a property interest is not ripe until the government enti-
ty charged with implementing the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the applica-
tion of the regulations to the property at issue."), with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 75-82
(1972) (holding that state law procedures enabling pre-judgment seizures of personal property "at
the same moment that the defendant receives the complaint seeking repossession of property
through court action," although "derived from... ancient possessory action" in replevin, violated
the Court's due process doctrines requiring some kind of hearing prior to the property depriva-
tion).
256. This was the reasoning in Williamson County, 473 U.S. 172 (1985) and in MacDonald,
Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 430 (1986), and, with respect to certain federal claims,
in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984). It was also the majority's reason for hold-
ing the claim premature in Penn Central. See Penn Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438
U.S. 104, 135-38 (1978).
257. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 8, at 1103-27; WRIGHT & KANE, supra note 87, at 314-
17 (discussing various rules of exhaustion of state nonjudicial remedies). This is not unlike Pull-
man or Colorado River abstention in effect. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
258. See San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323, 347-48
(2005) (holding that federal full faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, bars takings claim liti-
gated in California courts from being re-litigated in federal court); see also Krcmer v. Chem. Con-
str. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 485 (1982); England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S.
411,419 (1964).
259. See Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691,
703-04 (1982); Kremer, 456 U.S. at 466-79; Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94-98 (1980).
260. Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
261. Cf Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 392 (1994) (observing that takings claims
should not be "relegated to the status of poor relation" to other Bill of Rights claims routinely
heard in federal court).
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Quite remarkably, thus, the Supreme Court has increasingly allowed
that such claims, when filed first in federal court and "ripe" for adjudica-
tion, can be heard there despite the presence of unresolved state law
questions. 262 Professor Merrill even argued that these cases amount to an
alternative jurisdictional track.2 63 If so, that track widened in 2017 with
Murr v. Wisconsin.2 64 The development restrictions challenged in Murr
arose from a floodplain protection scheme designed to limit develop-
ment along the St. Croix River.265 Petitioners challenged restrictions on
small lot sale/development, a burden Wisconsin law declared should be
measured against all lots held in common ownership. 266 The majority
through Justice Kennedy held that denominator determinations like this
could not be made solely by recourse to extant local law but, instead,
should face a multi-factored doctrinal test the Murr Court fashioned.267
And this "elaborate test looking not only to state and local law," but also
to factors taken from the Court's own past takings opinions, 268 reshaped
the denominator inquiry into one without a presumptive forum. With
underlying entitlements like water rights, however, a compound legal
basis in both state and federal law is going to bring acute jurisdictional
troubles.
B. Tales from the Klamath: Water Rights as Property
A takings dispute so byzantine could only have arisen from our wa-
262. See, e.g., Knick v. Twp. of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2161 (2019) (holding that claim brought
under § 1983 need not be litigated in state forum if it is challenging an "act of taking" that has al-
ready occurred); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2001) (claim brought as § 1983 action
challenging state and local land use restrictions); City of Chicago v. Int'l Coll. of Surgeons, 522
U.S. 156, 164-74 (1997) (finding that removal of claim against city's landmark controls for inva-
lidity under state law and seeking federal takings liability was appropriate under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(a) and that federal courts could exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a) to hear state law claims because neither Burford nor Pullman abstention required the
court to defer to a state forum); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 735-44
(1997) (holding that takings claim against development restrictions was ripe under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 notwithstanding the authority's grant of as-yet-untraded transferable development rights
and claim in complaint that agency's refusals to act were unauthorized by law); cf Cty. of Alle-
gheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (diversity action in federal court challenging
validity of state condemnation).
263. See Merrill, supra note 241, at 1634-36.
264. 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
265. See id. at 1939-40.
266. See Id. at 1941 (citing Zealy v. Waukesha, 548 N.W.2d 528 (Wis. 1996)).
267. See Id. at 1945-50 (holding that "reasonable" owner expectations, applicable state or
local law, the timing of any pertinent legal changes, the property's physical characteristics, and the
total value of regulated property comprised the "appropriate multi-factor standard" for establish-
ing the relevant denominator).
268. id. at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., joined by Thomas and Alito, JJ., dissenting).
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ters federalism and its legal complexity.269 The Reclamation Act has al-
ways required the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (Bureau) to obtain under
state law whatever water rights its projects required. 270 This aspect of
the Act has remained gospel in reclamation states. 27 1 But since 1937 and
a stunning account of the Bureau's role in "project water" disputes in
Ickes v. Fox,2 72 reclamation deliveries have been said to vest a kind of
equitable right in those who put the water to beneficial use.27 3 The Bu-
reau's status under Ickes as mere "carrier and distributor of the water" 274
has posed incorrigible questions about its place amid competing state
and federal law and interests.275
It all began with a 2001 Bureau decision to deliver only about 10%
of the project water and to do that late in the season--owing to obliga-
269. On the combined state/federal structure of our takings law, see Mark Fenster, The
Stubborn Incoherence of Regulatory Takings Law, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L. REV. 525 (2009). Another
exemplar, the McBryde Sugar litigation from Hawai'i and the Ninth Circuit, might have done
equally well in this role. McBryde Sugar involved a judicial declaration of water rights seemingly
in derogation of Hawai'i customary and common law, see McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504
P.2d 1330 (Haw. 1973), a collateral federal court action alleging among other things violations of
due process, see Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Haw. 1977), an appeal resulting in
six certified questions to the state supreme court, see Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 658 P.2d 287 (Haw.
1982), a federal court injunction requiring the state to bring eminent domain proceedings if it
sought to enforce As original decision, see Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 753 F.2d 1468 (9th Cir. 1985), a
certiorari grant vacating that injunction and remanding in light of Williamson County, see Ariyo-
shi v. Robinson, 477 U.S. 902, 902 (1986), a defiant rejection by the district court of the state's
newly enacted water code as having mooted the case, see Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 676 F. Supp.
1002 (D. Haw. 1987), and the eventual dismissal of the case by the Ninth Circuit as moot. See
Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 887 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1989).
270. See Benson, supra note 34, at 374-82.
271. See WILKINSON, supra note 34, at 247-49; Amy K. Kelley, Developments in Water and
Environmental Law - Staging a Comeback-Section 8 of the Reclamation Act, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 97 (1984).
272. 300 U.S. 82 (1937).
273. Ickes, 300 U.S. at 94-95; see also Fox v. Ickes, 137 F.2d 30 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
320 U.S. 792 (1943).
274. Ickes, 300 U.S. at 95.
275. Reclamation Act § 8's enigma has consisted in its declaration that the United States
must "proceed in conformity" with "the laws of any State or territory relating to the control, ap-
propriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation, or any vested right acquired thereun-
der." Pub. L. No. 57-161, 32 Stat. 388, 390 (1902), (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 383). But § 8 also
states "[tihat the right to use of water acquired under [the Act] shall be appurtenant to the land
irrigated, and beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure, and the limit of the right," id., thereby
seemingly making use of delivered water into a (federal) condition on its delivery. See, e.g., Ne-
braska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 611-15 (1945) (reviewing the United States' claim as appropri-
ator under both riparian and prior appropriation law). And the balance of state and federal law
therein has become increasingly problematic as use shifting has grown more prevalent in the arid
states.
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tions under the Endangered Species Act (ESA),2 7 6 tribal treaties, and the
fact that its contractual partners had long been on notice that scarcity
could cut deliveries. 277 The Klamath basin spans the Oregon-California
border. A 1957 interstate compact 278 came only after it had been carved
up by reclamation infrastructure and diverted to irrigators. 279 The project
water deliveries had once seemed untouchable. 28 ° "For decades, Kla-
math Basin landowners generally received as much water for irrigation
as they needed. In severe drought years, they simply received somewhat
less."281 But federal authority and inertia are two different things.
282
As mentioned, doctrines of reclamation law have long sent conflict-
ing signals about state water law's significance to federal law.
283 In Ne-
vada v. United States,284 the Supreme Court held that the Bureau had no
discretion to reallocate water the United States had originally sued in
federal court to obtain for irrigation under state law because it remained
bound by that earlier decree. 285 The Nevada Court was evidently un-
276. Gray, supra note 27, at 23. Attributing a discretionary decision to the Bureau's 2001
actions is significant to the contract claims. In April 2001, Judge Armstrong of the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California enjoined the Bureau from implementing its opera-
tions plan that year, citing its Endangered Species Act § 7 duties. See Pac. Coast Fed'n of Fisher-
men v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 138 F. Supp. 2d 1228 (N.D. Cal. 2001). Later that month,
U.S. District Judge Aiken in Oregon denied the irrigators an injunction to force the deliveries they
sought. See Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001).
277. See Gray, supra note 27, at 23-25.
278. Congress ratified the compact in 1957. See Klamath River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No.
85-222, 71 Stat. 497 (1957).
279. See HOLLY DOREMUS & A. DAN TARLOCK, WATER WAR IN THE KLAMATH BASIN 44-
53 (2008). As the Colorado River most famously demonstrates, the timing of a compact profound-
ly affects its character, contents, and legal significance. See ROBERT W. ADLER, RESTORtNG
COLORADO RIVER ECOSYSTEMS: A TROUBLED SENSE OF IMMENSITY (2007); Patashnik, supra
note 128.
280. See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 279, at 10 (positing that "cultural" claims to the
waters of the Klamath Basin were as much or more important than economic measures and that
many of the irrigators burdened by the Bureau of Reclamation's eventual reversal and enforce-
ment of the ESA felt betrayed); cf Benson, supra note 34, at 383 ("Western resource users tend to
believe that any resource they have used for a long time with little regulation is theirs, even where
the law clearly does not recognize that resource as private property.").
281. Klamath lrr. Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 512 (Fed. Cl. Ct. 2005).
282. Duties levied by the Endangered Species Act, NEPA, and several other environmental
statutes constrain most federal authorities over waters. See Barbara A. Cosens, Farmers, Fish,
Tribal Power and Poker: Reallocating Water in the Truckee River Basin, Nevada and California,
10 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVT'L L. & POL'Y 89 (2003).
283. See Benson, supra note 34, at 375-80 (discussing California v. United States, 438 U.S.
645 (1978), City of Fresno v. California, 372 U.S. 627 (1963), and Ivanhoe Jrr. Dist. v. McCrack-
en, 357 U.S. 275 (1958)).
284. 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
285. See id. at 125-26. The Nevada Court invoked Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945), and Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937), what it called the "two leading cases," 463 U.S. at
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troubled by its holding's Erie implications.286 But if Nevada made fed-
eral law by adopting (or applying) the Restatement's preclusion princi-
ples, that would surely add another dimension to project water dis-
putes.28 7 For example, the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have both held that
the appropriator's beneficial use, not its contractual terms, decides the
quantity of an appropriation. 288 So the United States' peculiar status in
this context somewhere between servant and sovereign289 probably fore-
ordained the issues arising in the Klamath.29 ° If so, though, more of
these disputes are coming.
The raft of claims filed in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims (CFC)
arrived while the Klamath Basin adjudication, begun in an Oregon court
in 19 7 6 ,291 languished.292 The United States moved to stay the CFC ac-
tions arguing that priorities still to be determined in the basin adjudica-
122, for the proposition that what the United States acquired in its earlier litigation in Nevada
were the rights of those putting the water to beneficial use. See id. at 126.
286. Recall that in Klaxon v. Stentor, 313 U.S. 487, 494-96 (1941), the Court held that a
federal court sitting in diversity was bound to apply the forum state's conflicts of law rules-a
holding many understood to reach the recognition of judgments as well. Whether the Nevada ma-
jority intended to make a federal rule of decision was unstated. Only a mere footnote acknowledg-
ing the wide variation in preclusion law's basic principles-and the dramatic shifts in Restatement
doctrine-betrayed any awareness to the vertical choice of law question presented in Nevada. See
Nevada, 463 U.S. at 130 n. 12. The Court held years later that, at least as to diversity jurisdiction,
federal judgments' preclusive effects are ordinarily a matter of the state law in which the court
sits-absent some unique federal interest. See Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531
U.S. 497, 509 (2001).
287. A choice between "applying" another sovereign's law and "adopting" that law as one's
own follows from modem Erie. See Clermont, supra note 205. If Nevada made federal law, any
subsequent adjudication of project water would presumably be bound thereby.
288. See United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 697 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1983);
Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1134-41 (10th Cir. 1981). This is now the
refrain in some state courts as well. See, e.g., In re Yakima River Drainage Basin, 935 P.2d 595,
599-600 (Wash. 1997). Had it been the contract terms that governed, federal law would have con-
trolled the constructions thereof. See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448,
455-57 (1957); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943); D'oench,
Duhme & Co. v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1942).
289. As then-Justice Rehnquist observed in California v. United States, "[i]f the term 'coop-
erative federalism' had been in vogue in 1902, the Reclamation Act ... would surely have quali-
fied as a leading example of it." 438 U.S. 645, 650 (1978).
290. See Amy K. Kelley & Reed D. Benson, Federal Reclamation Law, in WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 41.05 (3d ed. 2017).
291. See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 279, at 43. The thirteen irrigation districts and
twelve individual users who sued in 2001 claimed damages from the United States in excess of $1
billion. See Gray, supra note 27, at 23.
292. The United States' declaratory judgment action on behalf of the Klamath tribes was
dismissed in deference to the basin adjudication. See United States v. Oregon, 44 F.3d 758, 765-
70 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Arizona v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983)). By the end
of the takings litigation, the Klamath Basin adjudication's end was at least in sight. See Baley v.
United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 635 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2017).
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tion were "required elements of Plaintiffs' takings claims." 293 The CFC
denied that stay (a year and a half later) because the court agreed with
plaintiffs that their claims asserted no "property" interest being deter-
mined in the state adjudication. 294 They were instead asserting a "vested
beneficial interest" in project water deliveries. 295 The mysteries of this
(non-)property interest would occupy federal and state courts for most of
the next two decades.296 For this 'water war' 297 was less about money
than cultural supremacy.
298
"Project water" would be "lost" downstream but for the federal in-
vestment, meaning the United States can and does put conditions on its
delivery. 299 The Bureau's terms had long expressly disclaimed liability
for scarcities preventing delivery.300 So the contract, compact, and tak-
ings claims necessarily turned on fine distinctions. Under both Califor-
nia and Oregon law, an appropriative right to water is usufructuary: a
293. Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 514 (Fed. Cl. Ct. 2005).
294. Id.
295. Id. This "vested beneficial interest" could well have been grounded in federal law from
a plausible interpretation of Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 94-95 (1937). See, e.g., Benson, supra note
34, at 385-86. Ironically, though, the exclusion of state property/water law which became a condi-
tion on the CFC's adjudication of the plaintiffs' claims never did focus the court's attention on
federal (common) law. See Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 641-43, 650-51; Klamath Irr. Dist., 67 Fed. Cl.
at 514.
296. See Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 69 Fed. Cl. 160 (Ct. Fed. CI. 2005); Klamath
Irr. Dist. v. United States, 75 Fed. Cl. 677 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2007); Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States,
532 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 227 P.3d 1145 (Or. 2010);
Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United
States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2016); Baley v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (Ct. Fed. Cl.
2017).
297. See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 279, at 1 I (quoting a 2004 Washington Post ed-
itorial pronouncing that "[i]n the Klamath Basin, there is no middle road: Either the farmers move
away, or the fish die.").
298. See id. at 195-97; ADLER, supra note 279, at 219-20; WILKINSON, supra note 34, at
274-92. In 2000, irrigation accounted for 7.3 million of the Colorado River's 8.8 million acre-feet
of appropriated water. Id. at 252. With much of that going to irrigate feed crops like alfalfa, there
is a great deal of room to improve the river's return-on-investment. Id. at 252-53.
299. See Israel v Morton, 549 F.2d 128, 132-33 (9th Cir. 1977). The federal storage project
at Lake Mead, for example, has enabled the State of Arizona to transfer tens of thousands of acre-
feet of Colorado River water that it cannot currently use and "bank" it at various locations, mostly
in aquifers, along its Central Arizona Project. See OWEN, supra note 51, at 140-45.
300. The bulk of the terms and conditions in reclamation law structure how much real prop-
erty irrigators may own, to whom they may sell, and for what purposes the water may be drawn
from project-funded infrastructure. See Benson, supra note 34, at 410-16; cf Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v.
McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-300 (1958) (upholding Bureau of Reclamation's actions enforcing
ownership limits and transfer restrictions). But expressly included in each of the contracts at issue
in the Klamath were disclaimers about scarcity-induced withholdings (titled "United States Not
Liable for Water Shortage"). See Gray, supra note 27, at 24.
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right not to the fluid itself but to the advantage of its use. 30 1 And under
the terms of the governing contracts from Upper Klamath Lake serving
Oregon, deliveries were due unless scarcity "[o]n account of drought or
other causes" prevented them.3°2 The CFC granted summary judgment
to the Bureau on all but a handful of the contractual claims in 2005.303
On appeal, the (non-)property interest came under the microscope.
The appeals court panel found a lack of "controlling precedent.., on
the pertinent issues of Oregon property law" 30 4 and certified several
questions thereon to the Oregon Supreme Court.30 5 Among the ques-
tions: whether Oregon law vested a "beneficial or equitable property in-
terest" in water delivered and put to beneficial use.30 6 It took the Oregon
Supreme Court two years, but it created that interest-an interest never
before declared by Oregon courts--out of relic precedents.3 °7 As epi-
sodes in judicial federalism go, nothing was particularly amiss in that.30 8
The flaws were more subtle. Although the Oregon court pointed to two
past instances where some entity held legal title to water rights in trust
for others, 3 9 it had no version of the key to trustee duties: they must be
301. See Klamath lrr. Dist. v. United States, 67 Fed. Cl. 504, 515-16 (Fed. Cl. Ct. 2005); cf
Joslin v. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 429 P.2d 889, 893-95 (Cal. 1967) (holding that California's
dual system of water rights is subject to a general "reasonableness" requirement protecting the
public interest and that separation of sand and gravel is not a reasonable use of water); Fort Van-
noy lrr. Dist. v. Water Res. Comm'n, 188 P.3d 277, 298-99 (Or. 2008) (holding that Oregon water
use certificates are and must be appurtenant to the land where the water is used).
302. 67 Fed. Cl. at 511.
303. As to the irrigators' usufruetuary interests, the court held that state law-by operation
of Reclamation Act § 8-made the United States the appropriator, 67 Fed. Cl. at 523-26, and that
any state law right to the water derived from the Bureau's deliveries would be subordinate to sen-
ior rights of tribes and other federal reservations. Id. at 538-39. It also held that nothing in the
compact enhanced these rights, leaving them junior to the United States' claims. Id. at 539-40.
That court later rejected the remaining contractual claims in Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 75
Fed. Cl. 677 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2007), and granted summary judgment to the United States. Id. at 677.
304. Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 532 F.3d 1376, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
305. See id. at 1377-78.
306. Id. at 1378.
307. It is telling that after having studied the question for almost two years and after having
recently held that irrigation districts' interests in appropriative rights under Oregon law were
merely in "trust" for irrigators, see Fort Vannoy, 188 P.3d at 295-96, the Oregon Supreme Court
could find no governing precedent, no statute, and no other source to support the existence of this
"equitable" (non-property) interest in project water and instead based its answer on Oregon cases
where appropriative rights-holders had themselves created rights-holding entities, together with
the construction of federal law from Nevada. See Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 227 P.3d
1145, 1162-66 (Or. 2010).
308. Cf Field, supra note 156, at 605-06 (defending certification of unresolved state law is-
sues over the exercise of abstention discretion).
309. See Klamath Irr. Dist., 227 P.3d at 1161 (discussing In re Water Rights of Willow
Creek 236 P. 487 (Or. 1925); Eldredge v. Mill Ditch Co., 177 P. 939 (Or. 1919)).
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willingly assumed by a trustee in a deal making that trustee the benefi-
ciary's fiduciary.310 A state court's equity jurisdiction could hardly put
that duty on the Bureau or construe the United States' contracts to do
so.
3 1 1
Project water thought to be "lost" downstream 312 is like many other
state jealousies that have long made the case for a federal forum.
3 13
Should we have hoped for better from the Oregon court? 3 14 In its return
to federal court, this equitable interest in project water became the feder-
al takings denominator the plaintiffs had sought.315 Vacating the CFC's
dismissal, the Federal Circuit ordered further proceedings.3 16 A lone dis-
senter noted just how evasive the Oregon court had been about this equi-
table interest: for all that could be gleaned from its opinion, the creation
of this relationship turned on the contractual terms between the United
States and those putting the water to beneficial use.317 The certified
questions had sought to unearth content from within Oregon law distinct
from the federal contracts.318 For as the Claims Court had first observed,
310. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625,
627 (1995). "Beneath the mechanics... lies the contractarian reality.... The trustee must volun-
tarily accept the trusteeship . I..." Id  at 636.
311. See Ivanhoe Irr. Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 289 (1958); see also United States
v. Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 871-87 (1996) (Souter, J., plurality opinion) (enforceability of United
States' contracts a matter of federal law); Bowen v. Pub. Agencies Opposed to Soc. Sec. Entrap-
ment, 477 U.S. 41, 52 (1986) (holding that surrenders of sovereign authority through public con-
tracts must, be in unmistakably clear terms).
312. See DOREMUS & TARLOCK, supra note 279, at 185.
313. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 534 ("It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that
the judiciary authority of the Union ought to extend ... to all those [causes] in which the state tri-
bunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiassed.").
314. Cf DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 125 (1996) (observing that "states
in our federal system serve not only as a countervailing force to federal power, but as an addition-
al moderator of their own internal conflicts"); Hershkoff, supra note 208, at 1920-23 (offering a
"public-values conception" of state judicial power wherein state courts seek to foster community
development).
315. See Klamath Irr. Dist. v. United States, 635 F.3d 505, 511-22 (Fed. Cir. 2011) [herein-
after Klamath III].
316. See id. at 522.
317. See id. at 523-25 (Gajarsa, J., concurring). Tucker Act jurisdiction has posed riddles
like this before. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en
banc) (Clevenger, J., dissenting) (arguing that plurality opinion substituted its own view of under-
lying state law of easement termination after state judiciary refused answers to certified questions
about easement). The construction of the United States' contractual obligations, however, would
ordinarily involve the proprietary interests of the United States and, therefore, the federal common
law thereof. See Clark, supra note 11, at 1361-75; Field, supra note 87, at 909-11, 953-58.
318. The closest thing to a denominator in the Oregon Supreme Court's answer was its dis-
cussion of Nevada-which, for its part, had invoked Ickes, California, and Nebraska v. Wyoming,
325 U.S. 589 (1937). However, none of those precedents construing the Bureau's Reclamation
Act § 8 role ever referred to anything other than a state law "property" interest derived from pro-
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the Reclamation Act itself does not vest any right to project water in an-
yone-be it an end user, irrigation district, or other-because it refers
throughout to water rights "otherwise acquired."31 9 The Oregon court's
heavy reliance on Nevada v. United States320 construing the Reclamation
Act's interface with Nevada law was, thus, misguided at best.321
But the CFC obliged on remand and heard arguments on whether the
Bureau's water withholdings amounted to a "physical" taking thereof.322
This physical taking theory promised to route plaintiffs' claims around
the factor balancing that has so frustrated Penn Central claimants. 323
The trouble with this theory was that water rights, whatever their value,
are never a claim on the fluid itself. A water right is not the right to pos-
ject water delivered and put to beneficial use. See Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110, 121-28
(1983).
319. See Klamath Irr. Dist., 67 Fed. Cl. at 516-23 (discussing Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82
(1937), and California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), and their combined effect of leaving
project water customers to the state law of appropriations for any water rights they might acquire).
320. See Klamath Irr. Dist., 227 P.3d at 1162-66. The Oregon court never let on that an "eq-
uitable" interest apart from state water rights law could only be properly adjudicated in an Oregon
forum-thc only authority with the state judiciary's equitable powers. See Sanchez-Llamas v. Or-
egon, 548 U.S. 331, 345-48 (2006) (holding that federal courts are without authority to impose
suppression of evidence remedy in state court's adjudication of state's alleged violation of Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations); Sea River Props., LLC v. Parks, 333 P.3d 295, 306-09 (Or.
2014).
321. Oddly, the Oregon court stated that it found Nevada's "analysis both persuasive and
consistent with Oregon law." Klamath Irr. Dist., 227 P.3d at 1163 (emphasis added). But the Su-
preme Court's holding in Nevada was that Nevada law vested a water right in those putting pro-
ject water to beneficial use. See Nevada, 463 U.S. at 126-28.
322. See Klamath Irr. v. United States, 129 Fed. Cl. 722, 731-37 (Ct. Fed. Cl. 2016). The
theory that a temporary withholding of water deliveries from government-owned infrastructure
was a "physical" (or "per se") taking avoiding Penn Central balancing had briefly convinced a
Federal Circuit panel in a similar case, Casitas Municipal Water District v. United States, 543
F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2008). That court had concluded, for purposes of denying summary judgment
wherein the government had conceded the existence of state law property interests in the water
delivery, that a diversion of water to a government-mandated fish ladder could be a "physical"
requisitioning of water to which the plaintiffs were entitled. Id. at 1292. Five years later-but be-
fore the CFC's decision and remand in Klamath 111-a different panel reversed course, holding
that the government's concessions for purposes of summary judgment were pivotal, that a Cali-
fornia water right to "beneficial use" of delivered water could not support a physical takings
claim, and that if any takings claim did accrue it would only be because the diverted water so di-
minished the supply that the plaintiffs' beneficial use was precluded. See Casitas Mun. Water Dist.
v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1353-59 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
323. Penn Central balances have rarely tilted in a claimant's favor, no doubt explaining the
rise of arguments (in water rights cases and elsewhere) that a taking is a physical requisitioning of
the property at issue and is therefore per se compensable. See Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
Dist. v. United States, 49 Fed. Cl. 313, 319 (Fed. Cl. 2001) (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. United States,
282 U.S. 399 (1931)); see also Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States, 708 F.3d 1340, 1352-53
(Fed. Cir. 2013); CRV Enters., Inc. v. United States, 626 F.3d 1241 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Washoe Cty.
v. United States, 319 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Estate of Hage v. United States, 82 Fed. Cl. 202
(Ct. Fed. Cl. 2008), rev'd, Estate of Hage v. United States, 687 F.3d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
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sess anything.3 24 It is an advantage of use: vested, delineated, exercised,
and transferred by its means of use.3 25 Fluid water, after all, is intangible
given its phase instability, incipient loss to vegetation, precipitation, and
gravity. Appropriative rights are thus unusual property interests: even in
elemental form they vest powers in others over one's interests.32 6 Such
rights resemble the interests owners have in a debt or in money-a claim
to some part of the wherewithal of another.
327
Nonetheless, the CFC-by the third judge to preside in the cases,
Judge Marian Blank Horn-held that "binding precedent" in the Federal
Circuit forced the conclusion that a failure to deliver project water
should be judged in the physical takings rubric.328 The irony, though,
came following Judge Horn's trial of the surviving claims in the Kla-
math; a trial focused on discrete contractual duties that also finally con-
fronted the tribal rights in the basin. 329 After parsing the relevant con-
324. See Benson, supra note 34, at 375-76 (citing HUTCHINS, supra note 63, at 140-41;
Frank J. Trelease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Water, 45 CAL. L. REV. 638
(1957)); cf Fort Vannoy Irr. Dist. v. Water Res. Comm'n, 188 P.3d 277, 296-98 (Or. 2008) (inter-
preting Oregon statute's "holder of any water use subject to transfer" to encompass only that water
put to beneficial use).
325. See Taiawagi Helton & Rhett Larson, Elements of Prior Appropriation, in WATERS
AND WATER RIGHTS at § 12.02(c)(2) (3d ed. 2017). The courts' repeated citations to International
Paper Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931), a case of the Secretary of War's bringing of em-
inent domain proceedings to requisition a water power and canal site on the Niagara River, id. at
404-06, was, thus, jurisdictionally nafve to say the least.
326. Seiior appropriative rights-holders generally may not change uses if it prejudices other
appropriators. See Farmers Highline Canal v. Golden, 272 P.2d 629 (Colo. 1954). This 'no injury'
rule has long entrenched implicit restrictions on appropriative rights. See HUTCHINS, supra note
63, at 649-50 (noting principles applicable to changes of use and the general rule that changes
harming other appropriators are generally disfavored); Mark Squillace, The Water Marketing So-
lution, 42 ENVTL. L. RPTR. 10800, 10804 (2012) (observing that the "[t]he real obstacle to the
[transferability] of water rights seems to be the uncertainty that the no injury rule brings to the
transfer"); NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQUITY,
AND THE ENV'T 38-67 (1992).
327. Penner describes property in debts as such. See PENNER, supra note 141, at 129-31. On
the property interests in money, see DAVID Fox, PROPERTY RIGHTS IN MONEY (2008). Notably,
the legal regime supporting money also tends "to ensure that the person with the possession of the
money or the practical power to spend it also has the best legal and beneficial title to it." Id. at 49.
This may explain the interests in project water, as well. See infra note 491 and accompanying text.
328. Klamath Irr., 129 Fed. Cl. at 732-36 (citing Casitas, 543 F.3d 1276). Judge Horn in
turn denied the government's motion in limine and granted plaintiffs' cross-motion, agreeing that
the claims "'should be analyzed under the physical takings rubric' at trial. Id. at 737. After trial,
Judge Horn reaffirmed the conclusion. See Baley v. United States, 134 Fed. Cl. 619, 663-64 (Ct.
Fed. Cl. 2017). But it remains unclear how a non-possessory equitable interest could suffer the
sort of physical intrusion which the Supreme Court has said is the prerequisite to this branch of
takings liability. Cf CRV Enters., 626 F.3d at 1243-48 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (rejecting physical takings
theory in case involving government's exclusion of riparian owner from navigable water on
grounds that no physical intrusion upon riparian's property had been imposed).
329. See Baley, 134 Fed. CI. at 644-45.
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tracts, 330 Judge Horn determined that none of the interests ostensibly
created thereby had been taken or impaired because the United States'
fulfillment of its treaty obligations starting in 2001-protecting the im-
periled species of the Klamath River-served water rights senior to the
claimants.' 331 In short, the instream flows fulfilled the most senior prior-
ities on the river.332 Given the "fundamental principle of water law in
prior appropriation states that a senior water right 'may be fulfilled en-
tirely before ... junior appropriators get any water at all,"'' 333 no taking
could logically have occurred.334
The claims' circularity was finally revealed. A federal forum exam-
ined every possible basis and found no colorable takings claim. But most
claims never go that distance. Ripeness and finality doctrines have often
idled water takings litigation in the CFC, a fate that may be rarer after
Knick v. Township of Scott.335 And Judge Horn's forcing the issue of
tribal treaty rights despite their never having been quantified predated
the Supreme Court's 2017 Murr opinion-which may now offer still
more options for a water-right takings claimant.336 Litigating these
330. Id. at 627-33, 652-59.
331. See id. at 670-80. "The court.., concluded that the Tribes' water right entitled them to
keep at least as much water in Upper Klamath Lake and the Klamath River as was necessary to
prevent jeopardizing the continued existence of the [imperiled fish species]" based on the biologi-
cal opinions produced by the wildlife agencies. Id. at 673.
332. Judge Horn's conclusion to this effect was most noteworthy since the tribes' basic pri-
ority had not yet been assigned a date--due at least in part to Colorado River abstention-nor had
it been quantified. See Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 668-72. The judge drew the legal conclusion that the
date was early enough and the amount great enough "to keep at least as much water in Upper
Klamath Lake and the Klamath River as was necessary to prevent jeopardizing" the listed species
of fish, as the agencies had thought was required by the Endangered Species Act. Id. at 673. The
Federal Circuit affirmed. See Baley v. United States, 2019 WL 5995861 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
333. Baley, 134 Fed. Cl. at 678 (quoting Montana v. Wyoming, 536 U.S. 368, 376 (2011)).
334. Although the court suggested that the tribes' treaty rights "hold a priority date of 'time
immemorial,"' id. at 670 (quoting United States v. Adair, 723 F.2d 1394, 1414 (9th Cir. 1983)), it
denied the claims being litigated by assuming without deciding that 1891-the date of the last ex-
ecutive order establishing the reservations-marked their priority dates. See id. at 670-71 (finding
that plaintiffs' earliest possible priority dates must all be at least ten years junior to tribes' latest
possible priority dates); See also Klamath Water Users Protect. Ass'n v. Patterson, 204 F.3d 1206,
1213-14 (9th Cir. 2000) (affirming district court judgment that Bureau was authorized to divert
water at Link River Dam to fulfill tribal water rights because tribes' rights "carry a priority date of
time immemorial") (quoting Adair, 723 F.2d at 1414).
335. Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2179 (2019) (overruling Williamson Cty.
Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), and holding that § 1983 claims
of takings may be litigated in federal court if alleged act of taking has already occurred). This will
undoubtedly shift the jurisdictional picture in water takings cases, as well. See, e.g., Casitas, 708
F.3d at 1358-60; Estate of Hage, 687 Fed. Cir. at 1287.
336. See supra notes 262-68 and accompanying text.
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claims is treacherous and costly work,33 7 likely more so now after
Murr.338 But ping-ponging between state and federal forums-which
once had seemed a remote and dystopic prospect33 9-may well become
the norm given the jurisdictional posture of so many water rights, the
overcommitment of "project water" throughout the West, and the criss-
cross of jurisdictional lanes for declaring the applicable law. If litigation
costs are not prohibitive, intensifying drought and scarcities will almost
surely push that edge. And it is one where, again, the jurisdictional con-
fusions will only deepen.
IV. DEFINING "WATERS": A DELEGATION TO WHOM?
When Congress set aside a jurisdictional term found throughout its
momentous water pollution amendments in 1972,340 it declared "naviga-
ble waters" included all "waters of the United States, including the terri-
torial seas."34 ' Decades of fractured authority to interpret the statute
have since left landowners to sift through mountains of disparate judicial
and administrative declarations. 34 2 Mistakes can be penalized severe-
ly, 343 posing hard questions about the force of administrative rules.34 4 (A
337. See Gray, supra note 27, at 26.
338. In applying Murr, it is unclear whether the water rights law of the situs state should ex-
haust the Murr factor for "state or local law" or rather whether prior appropriation more generally
should. Cf Reed D. Benson, Maintaining the Status Quo: Protecting Established Water Uses in
the Pacific Northwest, Despite the Rules of Prior Appropriation, 28 ENVTL. L. 881 (1998) (find-
ing that the most consistent commonality of water rights law throughout the Pacific Northwest has
been protecting the status quo).
339. See Williamson B.C. Chang, Missing the Boat: The Ninth Circuit, Hawaiian Water
Rights and the Constitutionality of Retroactive Overruling, 16 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 123,
128-35 (1986) (discussing the McBryde Sugar litigation and characterizing it as an outlier born of
extreme litigiousness and willful judges).
340. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86
Stat. 816 (1972), were designated the "Clean Water Act" in 1977. See Pub. L. No. 95-217, § 2, 91
Stat. 1566, 1566 (1977).
341. See 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2012).
342. United States v. Hawkes Co., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1812 (2016).
343. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. at 1812 ("It is often difficult to determine whether a particular
parcel of property contains waters of the United States, but there are important consequences if it
does."). Writing separately in Sackett v. EPA, Justice Alito made special note that if "owners do
not do the EPA's bidding [given the presence of jurisdictional waters), they may be fined up to
$75,000 per day." Sackctt v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 132 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring).
344. Administrative rules' place in federal supremacy has never been assured. See Wayman
v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 43-46 (1825) ("The line has not been exactly drawn which
separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from
those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who
are to act under such general provisions."). Although the Court still adheres to the fiction that
Congress may not delegate "legislative Power," see Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S.
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mature literature about that force evidences little consensus. 345) But this
horizontal struggle over Congress's delegation bears uncanny resem-
blance to the vertical jurisdictional muddles of Parts II and III. Section A
describes the Act's joint administration by the Corps of Engineers and
EPA in competition with the judiciary while Section B examines the role
of provable facts within that competition.
A. Judicial or Administrative Authority?
Federal and state systems have long been adapting the concept of
navigable waters.346 When the Supreme Court broke federal admiralty
jurisdiction away from Westminster's traditions in the mid-nineteenth
century, it turned to navigation and navigability.3 47 It also linked Con-
gress's commerce power to navigation and navigability.348 When the
457, 487-88 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring), that itself may portend other changes. See, e.g.,
Heather Elliott, Justice Gorsuch's Would-Be War on Chevron, 21 GREENBAG (2d) 315 (2018).
345. See Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003 (2015); Kristin
E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465 (2013); Jacob E. Gersen, Legis-
lative Rules Revisited, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1705 (2007); John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893 (2004); Thomas W. Merrill & Katherine Tongue Watts, Agency Rules
with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); William Funk,
When is a "Rule" a Regulation?: Marking a Clear Line Between Nonlegislative Rules and Legis-
lative Rules, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 659 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chev-
ron's Domain, 103 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Paul R. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemak-
ing: Waiting for Vermont Yankee 11, 55 TUL. L. REV. 418 (1981); Glenn 0. Robinson, The
Making ofAdministrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication in Administrative
Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485 (1970).
346. See ROBERTSON supra note 85, at 104-22; Daniel J. Hulsebosch, Writs to Rights:
"Navigability" and the Transformation of the Common Law in the Nineteenth Century, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1049 (2002); Robert W. Adler, The Ancient Mariner of Constitutional Law:
The Historical, Yet Declining Role of Navigability, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1643 (2013); Maureen E.
Brady, Defining "Navigability ": Balancing State-Court Flexibility and Private Rights in Water-
ways, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1415 (2015). Navigable rivers played a unique role in European impe-
rialism. See LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN
EUROPEAN EMPIRES, 1400-1900 (2010).
347. See The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 458-59 (1851)
(overruling 'ebb and flow of the tide' test articulated in The Thomas Jefferson, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 428 (1825), embracing a 'navigated-in-fact' test for admiralty jurisdiction); The Magno-
lia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296, 301 (1857) (holding that "navigable" river, regardless of tidal influ-
ence, was within admiralty jurisdiction); The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15, 24 (1868) (interpreting
Genesee Chief to extend jurisdiction under the first Judiciary Act to all waters where navigation
was possible); The Steamer Montello, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 430 (1874) (describing the use of canoes
carrying goods); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17, 29-34 (1903) (finding that the Erie Canal
was "navigable water" subject to admiralty jurisdiction).
348. See, e.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1870) (extending Commerce Clause
authority to all waters used or susceptible to use in interstate or foreign commerce); United States
v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899) (upholding assertion of federal authority over
non-navigable reach of navigable-in-fact river); United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co.,
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federal common law vesting states with sovereign title to navigable wa-
ters hardened, it made still another use of the concept.3 49 And as has
been chronicled repeatedly, with so many legal relations turning on nav-
igability, elasticity became the norm.350 By 1972, it was a venerable-if
varied-jurisdictional boundary. A conference committee report cast the
1972 definitional step as a congressional choice to assert federal authori-
ty to the limits of Article I and it influenced several early judicial inter-
pretations. 351 The text of the statute, though, declared no such thing352
and getting the Corps to commit to such jurisdiction took a court order
sought by citizen-plaintiffs.353 The ambiguity was apparently pivotal to
the Act's passage through Congress.354 By the end of the decade,
though, both agencies were asserting CWA authority over much more
311 U.S. 377 (1940) (upholding assertion of federal authority over waters susceptible to naviga-
tion with reasonable improvements, even for purposes besides enhancing navigation).
349. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26-28 (1894); United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1
(1935); Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1226-28. -
350. See ROBERTSON supra note 85, at 104-22; Hulseboseh, supra note 346, at 1090-1105;
Adler, supra note 346, at 1651-69; Brady, supra note 346, at 1421-33.
351. See United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317, 1323-24 (6th Cir.
1974); United States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 668-73 (M.D. Fla. 1974); see also Sam Kalen,
Commerce to Conservation: The Callfor a National Water Policy and the Evolution of Federal
Jurisdiction Over Wetlands, 69 N.D. L. REV. 873, 891-94 (1993) (discussing Holland's use of the
committee report and the agencies' subsequent turn toward expanding CWA jurisdiction in line
with the committee statement). The Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1948 applied only to
"interstate" waters, a jurisdictional scope Congress retained across multiple amendments-until
1972. See N. William Hines, History of the 1972 Clean Water Act: The Story Behind How the
1972 Act Became the Capstone on a Decade of Extraordinary Environmental Reform, 6 GEO.
WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 80, 98-99 (2013). Notably, though, the Rivers and Harbors Ap-
propriation Act of 1899 had prohibited covered discharges to "any navigable water of the United
States, or into any tributary of any navigable water ..." Kalur v. Resor, 335 F. Supp. 1, 9 (D.D.C.
1971) (quoting Act of Mar. 3, 1899, ch. 425, § 13, 30 Stat. 1152 (1899), codified at 33 U.S.C.
§ 407).
352. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. United States, 531 U.S. 159, 172-74
(2001).
353. See Kalen, supra note 351, at 892-93 (discussing Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Callaway,
392 F. Supp. 685 (D.D.C. 1975), and the court's decree ordering the Corps of Engineers to amend
its rules to assert jurisdiction under the CWA in keeping with Congress's decision). The Act's cit-
izen suit provision, CWA § 505(a), predating as it did the repeal of the amount-in-controversy
requirement from 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) and the waiver of sovereign immunity for all APA actions
in 1976, blazed a novel path into federal court leading to that decree. See Gwaltney of Smithfield
v. Chesapeake Bay Found., 484 U.S. 49, 52-54 (1987) (discussing the jurisdictional grant and
cause of action provided by 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)). But by 1976, federal question jurisdiction was
broadened considerably. See Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 104-09 (1977) (discussing amend-
ments' effects on federal question jurisdiction).
354. See Hines, supra note 351, at 104. Courts and commentators often disparage Congress
for its strategic uses of ambiguity, but it is far from clear that Congress has much choice in the
matter. See KREHBIEL, supra note 14, at 230; VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW,
MISREADING DEMOCRACY 25-33, 99-101 (2016).
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territory than just "navigable-in-fact" waterways.355 The question had
become whether the courts would foster or fetter that effort.
The Act's purpose was "the restoration and maintenance of the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters,- 356 a
purpose that could not be served by ignoring waters' connections to wa-
tersheds or trends like overuse, urbanization, eutrophication, species
loss, etc. 357 The Corps had first consolidated four categories of § 502(7)
"waters" by regulation in 1977.358 (EPA had done so to varying degrees
of formality since 1973. 3 59) The categories were (1) navigable-in-fact
streams, rivers, lakes, coastal waters, and the wetlands "adjacent" there-
to; (2) tributaries of (1); (3) "interstate" streams, rivers, lakes, and their
tributaries and adjacent wetlands; and (4) all "other waters" "the degra-
dation or destruction of which could affect interstate commerce. 3 60 Cat-
egories (1)-(3) by then had all appeared in some judicial precedent con-
struing jurisdictional waters, i.e., had had their federal interest declared
by an Article III court.361 Interstate waters had long been the subject of
the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction.362 Tributaries had often fea-
355. This evolution has been ably described elsewhere. See Kalen, supra note 351, at 879-
97; Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence and the Limits of Federal Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1999).
356. Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 101(a), 86 Stat. 816, 816 (1972), codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
357. See ENVTL. LAW INST., AT THE CONFLUENCE OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND PRIOR
APPROPRIATION 6-12 (2013); Jamison E. Colburn, Coercing Collaboration: The Chesapeake Bay
Experience, 40 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV. 677, 698-704 (2106).
358. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Final Rule-Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Eng'rs, 42 Fed. Reg. 37,122, 37,127-28 (1977). Two interim final rules preceded the 1977 rule-
making but had not yet consolidated their terms as did the 1977 regulations. See id. at 37,127.
359. EPA's 1980 consolidated permitting rules first brought together the same four catego-
ries as the Corps, although a multitude of administrative rules had previously asserted the expan-
sive interpretations of "waters." See U.S. EPA, Final Rule-Consolidated Permitting Rules, 45
Fed. Reg. 33,290 (1980), and were reorganized in 1983 to take the form litigated in the seminal
cases. See U.S. EPA, Final Rule-Environmental Permit Regulations, 48 Fed. Reg. 14,146,
14,157 (1983).
360. 42 Fed. Reg. at 37127.
361. The terse explanation of the 1977 list declared an intent to track what prior federal
precedents had adjudicated was within jurisdictional reach. See 42 Fed. Reg. at 37127-30 (discuss-
ing United States v. Ashland Oil and Transportation, 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974) and Natural
Resources Defense Council. v. Train, 366 F. Supp. 1393 (D.D.C. 1975)). Key to the 1977 rules
were the addition of wetlands (upland of mean high-water) and small tributaries of navigable-in-
fact waters. See Kalen, supra note 351, at 897-906.
362. See supra note 103 and accompanying text. The Trump Administration rule aims to
eliminate interstate waters from § 502(7). See Dept. of Defense, Environmental Prot. Agency,
Proposed Rule-Revised Definition of "Waters of the United States, 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4171-72
(2019).
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tured in litigation of navigable waters' limits.363 Navigated-in-fact wa-
ters, i.e., used for transport, had been included in states' public trust at
least since 1971.364 A normalized mean high tide line as a water's lateral
limit dates from at least 1935.365 The addition of adjacent wetlands to
CWA jurisdiction had grown from litigation of the Rivers and Harbors
acts' lateral limits in the lead up to 1972.366 Finally, category (4) waters
stemmed from the Supreme Court's 'nexus to commerce' precedents on
Article I's limits.
367
But jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries and connected wet-
lands was immediately contentious.368 The Corps itself was unsure how
far laterally or upstream its permitting authority should reach.3 69 An
agency turf battle settled in 1979370 bound the Corps to EPA's interpre-
tations of § 502(7) and focused the attention on target areas' legal ties to
commerce. 371 A case-by-case approach expanded the Act's jurisdictional
363. See United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irr. Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899); Economy Light
& Power Co. v. United States, 256 U.S. 113 (1921); Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson
Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941); United States v. Grande River Dam Auth., 363 U.S. 229 (1960); United
States v. Underwood, 344 F. Supp. 486 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States v. Ashland Oil & Transp.
Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phelps Dodge Corp., 391 F. Supp. 1181 (D.
Ariz. 1975).
364. See Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 11-13 (1971).
365. See Borax Consol., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, 296 U.S. 10, 24-27 (1935); see also Leslie Salt
Co. v. Froehlke, 403 F. Supp. 1292, 1297 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
366. See United States v. Stoeco Homes, Inc., 498 F.2d 597, 602-07 (1974); United States v.
Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 676 (M.D. Fla. 1974); Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199, 201-03, 207-11
(5th Cir. 1970).
367. See 42 Fed. Reg. at 37124; id. at 37127 (citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146
(1970); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1974); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942)).
368. See Kalen, supra note 351, at 905-13; Colburn, supra note 39, at 88-93. The first prec-
edent on tributaries of navigable-in-fact waters under § 502(7), Ashland Oil, 504 F.2d 1317, in-
voked but then distinguished federal common law's 'navigational servitude' and declared that it
would "make a mockery of those powers if [Congress's] authority to control pollution was limited
to the bed of the navigable stream itself." Id. at 1326. "The tributaries which join to form the riv-
er," the court continued, "could then be used as open sewers as far as federal regulation was con-
cerned. The navigable part of the river could become a mere conduit for upstream waste." Id. at
1326-27 (quoting Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941)).
369. See Colburn, supra note 39, at 109-10 & n.198.
370. EPA was declared to be the "ultimate administrative authority [in construing] the juris-
dictional term 'navigable waters' in their shared programs under CWA § 404. See Benjamin R.
Civiletti, Administrative Authority to Construe § 404 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
43 Op. ATT'NY GEN. 197 (1979).
371. See Elaine Buesehen, Do Isolated Wetlands Substantially Affect Interstate Commerce?
46 AM. U. L. REV. 931, 936-43 (1997); Daryn McBeth, Wetlands Conservation and Federal
Regulation: An Analysis of the Food Security Act's Swampbuster Provisions as Amended by the
Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 201, 222-46
(1997). EPA's focus on this nexus remained tacit in its 1980 consolidated permitting rules. See
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Consolidated Permit Regulations, 45 Fed. Reg. 33290
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scope as the precedents mounted.37 2 Supreme Court precedents confirm-
ing the Commerce Clause's elasticity were vital.373 But given the gradi-
ent waters comprise, controversy over the delegation's scope eventually
came to overshadow most other issues.3 74
Reversing the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court held in United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes375 that connected wetlands could be "wa-
ters" within § 502(7), declaring that jurisdiction originated from and
turned upon the wetlands' ecological influence on the traditional "wa-
ter."376 In sustaining the agencies' extension of CWA jurisdiction "to all
wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their tributar-
ies,'377 the Court declared that "Congress evidently intended to repudi-
ate limits that had been placed on federal regulation by earlier water pol-
lution control statutes and to exercise its powers under the Commerce
Clause to regulate at least some waters that would not be deemed "navi-
gable" under the classical understanding of that term. '378 Noting that
bills to constrain the agencies had all stalled in Congress, 379 the River-
(1980). By 1988, its focus on the commerce nexus had firmed considerably. See U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency, Final Rule-Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Definitions and
'Permit Exemptions, 53 Fed. Reg. 20764, 20765 (1988) (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview
Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121 (1985)).
372. EPA's first CWA § 404(b) "guidelines" cited United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204 (7th
Cir. 1979), and Leslie Salt Co. v. Froehlke, 578 F.2d 742 (9th Cir. 1978). See U.S. EPA, Guide-
lines for Specification of Disposal Sites for Dredged or Fill Material, 45 Fed. Reg. 85336, 85340
(1980). Each case involved extensive expert testimony surrounding the target area and its individ-
ual nexus to commerce. See Byrd, 609 F.2d at 1207-09; Leslie Salt, 578 F.2d at 745-47.
373. As I have shown before, the earliest CWA jurisdictional challenges in the 1970s and
'80s played out in the shadow of United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377
(1940). That Court held that if cost-effective improvements could render a water navigable-in-
fact, Congress's Article 1, § 8 powers extended to that water. See id. at 407-08; Colburn, supra
note 39, at 95 & n. 116.
374. See Kalen, supra note 351, at 909-13; Adler, supra note 355, at 19-30; Colburn, Gov-
erning the Gradient, supra note 39, at 111-15.
375. 474 U.S. 121 (1985).
376. Cf id. at 134-35 (noting that the agencies had concluded adjacent wetlands "may func-
tion as integral parts of the aquatic environment" and that that conclusion was one to which the
courts should defer). The Sixth Circuit had held that wetlands could not be "waters" and that if
that were Congress's intent, it effectuated a taking of the defendant's property. See United States
v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 729 F.2d 391, 397-98 (6th Cir. 1984) (citing Kaiser Aetna v.
United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
377. Riverside, 474 U.S. at 129.
378. Id. at 133 (citing S. CONF. REP. No. 92-1236, p. 144 (1972)). The oft-repeated Confer-
ence Report statement was that "[t]he conferees fully intend that the term "navigable waters" be
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation unencumbered by agency determinations
which have been made or may be made for administrative purposes." S. REP. No. 92-1236, 92d
Cong., 2d Sess., at 144, reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 3822.
379. See Riverside, 474 U.S. at 135-39.
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side Court found that the CWA was a delegation to the agencies. 380 And
with that endorsement, rulemakings in 1986381 and 1988,382 flanked by
guidance pressing the nexus-to-commerce linkage, 38 3 focused reviewing
courts on the precise scope of the delegation.
384
In Solid Waste Agency of North Cook County v. United States385 and
Rapanos v. United States386 the Court reconsidered its Riverside hold-
ing. Where Solid Waste declared that jurisdiction over small, geograph-
ically "isolated" waters went beyond the delegation, 387 the Rapanos
Court seemed to cloud all assertions of jurisdiction over non-navigable
tributaries or adjacent wetlands in a fractious, muddled interpretation of
the law.38 8 Without a hint of irony,389 the Chief Justice separately scold-
380. See id., 474 U.S. at 134 (holding that the agencies' interpretation could not be set aside
unless it was "unreasonable" within the meaning of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984)). Riverside's apparent theory of delegation was Chev-
ron's "delegation-by-ambiguity" argument Justice Stevens' opinion had brought to prominence.
See Merrill & Hickman, supra note 345, at 838-39, 870-72.
381. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, Final Rule for Regulatory Programs of the Corps of
Engineers, 51 Fed. Reg. 41206 (1986).
382. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Final Rule-Clean Water Act Section 404 Program Def-
initions and Permit Exemptions, 53 Fed. Reg. 20764 (1988).
383. See 51 Fed. Reg. at 41216-17; 53 Fed. Reg. at 20765. These rulemakings-in the wake
of Riverside and following years of White House involvement through its 'Task Force on Regula-
tory Review'-signaled each agency's full intention to assert jurisdiction on a "case-by-case ba-
sis" over waters bearing some provable nexus to interstate commerce. See Kalen, supra note 351,
at 905-06 & n. 172.
384. At least one district court held that, before migratory bird use could serve as the con-
nection between a target site and navigable waters, the agencies would need a rulemaking to that
effect. See Tabb Lakes, LTD v. United States, 715 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1988), affd, 885 F.2d
866 (4th Cir. 1989). The Eighth Circuit had held that the Corps could not assert jurisdiction over
wetlands that its own river maintenance activities had created. See United States v. City of Fort
Pierre, 747 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1984). The Seventh Circuit had expressed misgivings about the as-
sertion of jurisdiction over an "isolated" wetland in Hoffman Group, Inc. v. EPA, 961 F.2d 1310,
1321-23 (7th Cir. 1992). EPA's administrative penalty order was later set aside in that case for a
lack of evidence connecting the site to navigable waters in Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d
256 (7th Cir. 1993). That court also rejected the use of groundwater to link an artificial pond to
navigable waters. See Village of Oconomowoc Lake v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 24 F.3d 962, 965-
66 (7th Cir. 1994). And in United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Cir-
cuit rejected the extension of jurisdiction to waters that "could affect interstate commerce" as in-
consistent with United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). See id. at 257 (setting aside 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3) (1993) (emphasis in original)).
385. 531 U.S. 159 (2001). The Solid Waste Court distinguished "isolated" waters from the
"adjacent" wetlands of Riverside by the latter's supposed "significant nexus" to Lake St. Claire.
See id. at 167-68.
386. 547 U.S. 715 (2006).
387. See Solid Waste Agency, 531 U.S. at 167-74 (concluding that, for the Act to reach such
"waters," Congress would have to have made a clear statement of its intentions to that effect given
the overlapping state and local government authority to regulate such areas).
388. C( Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 810 & n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that a concurrence
by Justice Kennedy supporting CWA jurisdiction over any target areas bearing a "significant nex-
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ed the agencies for failing to clarify their interpretations. 390 But this in-
ternecine struggle left a jurisdictional mess to the lower courts. 391 A year
later, the agencies published guidance for their field offices. 392 To the
agencies, non-navigable tributaries of "traditional navigable waters," '393
together with wetlands having provable connections to such tributaries,
were jurisdictional-at leaist where the connections were relatively con-
stant and robust.394 Yet the jurisdictional troubles kept deepening as
gradient indeterminacy combined with the vagaries of evidence gather-
ing and other variabilities in the field.395 Enforcement actions became
polarizing jurisdictional battles, one permutation of tributary, wetland,
or degree of connectivity at a time.396
us" to navigable waters had only his vote and should be interpreted by lower courts, in tandem
with the dissenters' deference to the agencies, as supporting jurisdiction anywhere the plurality's
requirements were met or where the nexus test was met).
389. ESTREICHER & SEXTON, supra note 216, at 95. Whatever the merits of the Court's tak-
ing a "maximalist" approach in its opinions, compare Grove, supra note 101, (defending "vertical
maximalism" to promote clarity and settlement in federal law), its demonstrated inability to do so
with jurisdiction over counsels pursuing other solutions. See infra Part V.
390. See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 757-58 (Roberts, C.J., concurring).
391. See Colbum, supra note 39, at 88-90.
392. See U.S. EPA & U.S. Dept. of the Army, Clean Water Jurisdiction Following the U.S.
Supreme Court's Decision in Rapanos v. United States & Carabell v. United States (June 5, 2007)(hereafter "2007 Guidance") (copy on file with author). Besides the categorical inclusion of "tra-
ditional" navigable waters and interstate waters, the agencies also signaled in a "summary of key
points" that they "generally" would not assert jurisdiction over "swales or erosional features," or
"[d]itches (including roadside ditches) excavated wholly in and draining only uplands and that do
not carry a relatively permanent flow of water .. " Id. at 1. By the time this 2007 Guidance was
published, a lower federal court had already held that Rapanos supported reaching non-navigable
tributaries and adjacent wetlands bearing a "significant nexus" to navigable and interstate waters.
See United States v. Gerke Excavating, 464 F.3d 723, 724-25 (7th Cir. 2006).
393. "Traditional navigable waters" were waters currently, historically, or susceptible to be-
ing used "in interstate or foreign commerce, including all waters which are subject to the ebb and
flow of the tide." 2007 Guidance, supra note 392, at 4.
394. See 2007 Guidance, supra note 392, at 5.
395. EPA was again faulted in 2008 for not adapting its jurisdictional practices to Solid
Waste and Rapanos. See Amer. Petro. Inst. v. Johnson, 541 F. Supp. 2d 165, 178-85 (D.D.C.
2008). Yet opinions in the courts of appeal soon turned toward the Rapanos dissenters' view that
§ 502(7) extended to any water matching either the plurality's or Justice Kennedy's interpretation.
See United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2011) (collecting cases)). By 2018,
"[a]ll circuit courts that ha[d] ruled on the matter ha[d] concluded that an area meeting Justice
Kennedy's significant nexus test is within CWA jurisdiction, although some circuit courts ha[d]
decided that jurisdiction applies if the area meets either the significant nexus test or the plurality's
'relatively permanent' test." J.B. Ruhl, Proving the Rapanos Significant Nexus, 33(1) NAT. RES. &
ENVT. 51, 52 (Summer 2018).
396. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 467 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2006); United States v. Moses,
496 F.3d 984 (9th Cir. 2007); United States v. Robison, 505 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2007); United
States v. Cundiff, 555 F.3d 200 (6th Cir. 2009); United States v. Brink, 795 F. Supp.2d 565 (S.D.
Tex. 2011); United States v. Vierstra, 803 F. Supp.2d 1166 (D. Idaho 2011); United States v.
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B. Judicial Choice: Facts, Fictions, and Article III
By 2015, groundwater, canals, and transfers relocating tributary flow
had all joined wetlands and non-navigable tributaries at § 502(7)'s con-
tentious frontier.397 But the guidance 398 was to be replaced by a "Clean
Water Rule" (CWR).3 99 And EPA's vast literature review synthesizing
some 1,200 peer-reviewed articles on the connectivity of streams and
wetlands to downstream waters aimed directly at the Court's Rapanos
and Solid Waste opinions.4"' Federalist fears of creeping centraliza-
tion 40 ' were answered with domain expertise, the agencies' case for
rulemaking over case-by-case adjudications, and the fact that the CWA
delegation had fractured the Court in Rapanos.
In a methodical and exhaustive Connectivity Report, EPA found that
"[w]aters are connected in myriad ways, including physical connections
and the hydrologic cycle; however, connections occur on a continu-
um... from highly connected to highly isolated.- 40 2 It identified five
Hamilton, 952 F. Supp.2d 1271 (D. Wyo. 2013); United States v. Smith, 303 F.R.D. 630 (S.D.
Ala. 2014).
397. See Catskill Mtns. Chap. Trout Ultd., Inc. v. EPA, 8 F. Supp. 3d 500, 506-17 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (reviewing regulatory and litigation history of water transfers), rev'd Catskill Mtns. Chap.
Trout Ultd., Inc. v. EPA, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017); Los Angeles Cty. Flood Control Dist. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 710, 711-13 (2013) (reviewing litigation his-
tory of engineered tributaries); Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Defense Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1326, 1331-34
(2013) (reviewing litigation and guidance history of stormwater runoff discharges); Hawai'i Wild-
life Fund v. County of Maui, 24 F. Supp.3d 980, 992-98 (D. Haw. 2014) (describing litigation his-
tory of groundwater), affd, Hawai'i Wildlife Fund v. Cty. of Maui, 886 F.3d 737 (9th Cir. 2018).
Each of the most controversial boundaries were addressed by either the Clean Water Rule or other
rulemakings. See Clean Water Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. at 37075-80 (tributaries and ditches); id. at
37099-100 (groundwater); U.S. EPA, Final Rule-National Pollutant Discharge Elimination Sys-
tem (NPDES) Water Transfers Rule, 73 Fed. Reg. at 33697 (2008) (exempting water transfers'
conduits, canals, and other conveyances from definition of "point source").
398. See Richard E. Glaze, Jr., Rapanos Guidance III: "Waters" Revisited, 42 ENVTL. L.
RPTR. 10118 (2012). Guidance occupies an uneasy middle ground between "legislative" rules that
bind the public, the agency, and the courts and policy statements that bind no one. See Peter L.
Strauss, The Rulemaking Continuum, 41 DUKE L.J. 1463, 1475-87 (1992).
399. See U.S. Dept. of Defense, U.S. EPA, Final Rule-Clean Water Rule: Definition of
"Waters of the United States," 80 Fed. Reg. 37054 (2015).
400. See U.S. EPA, CONNECTIVITY OF STREAMS & WETLANDS TO DOWNSTREAM WATERS:
A REVIEW & SYNTHESIS OF THE SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE EPA/600/R-14/475F (2015) [hereinafter
CONNECTIVITY REPORT]; Colburn, supra note 39, at 105-15.
401. In both cases, the constitutionality of reaching attenuated areas was put in doubt. Cf
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 172 (2001)
("Where an administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer limits of Congress' power,
we expect a clear indication that Congress intended that result."); Rapanos v. United States, 547
U.S. 715, 738 (2006) ("[T]he Corps' interpretation stretches the outer limits of Congress's com-
merce power and raises difficult qfiestions about the ultimate scope of that power.").
402. See 80 Fed. Reg. at 37057; see also CONNECTIVITY REPORT, supra note 400, at § 2.4.
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distinct mechanisms of functional connectivity in detail: materials sourc-
ing and sinking (transport); refuge; transformation of biological, chemi-
cal, and physical constituents; and time-lagging.4 °3 It documented how
connectivity varies over space and time-variability that can be meas-
ured in frequency, duration, magnitude, sequence, and rapidity.40 4 And it
noted humanity's constant interference with and alterations of that con-
nectivity.4 °5
Yet these findings came backing a rulemaking that was neither re-
quired nor sanctioned by the Act.40 6 They were finalized without any
adversarial testing.40 And they cast § 502(7)'s true geographic scope as
a fundamental challenge to our jurisdiction-splitting ways. The agencies
signaled clearly their intent that the rule be "legislative," changing wa-
403. See CONNECTIVITY REPORT, supra note 400, at ES-6. The Report's five "major" con-
clusions trace the connectivity of streams, wetlands, and open waters by degree and by mecha-
nisms falling somewhere along the gradient EPA described, finishing with the conclusion that
"[d]ownstream waters are the time-integrated result of all waters contributing to them." Id. at ES-
5.
404. See CONNECTIVITY REPORT, supra note 400, at 2-29. "Connectivity is not a fixed char-
acteristic of a system, but varies over space and time... [and] results primarily from the longitu-
dinal and lateral expansion and contraction of the river network and transient connection with oth-
er components of the river system." Id. (internal citations omitted).
405. Compare Matthew J. Cohen et al., Do Geographically Isolated Wetlands Influence
Landscape Functions?, 113 PROC. AMER. ACAD. SCi. 1978, 1983 (2016) (detailing the dramatic
influences human alterations of landscapes exert on the connectivity of wetlands and attenuated
tributaries to downstream waters), with CONNECTIVITY REPORT, supra note 400, at 5-10 (conclud-
ing from a series of ease-studies that the effects of human alterations depend on the water body
type, are typically complex and that coupled human-natural systems are an area of active re-
search). An independent synthesis following the Connectivity Report confirmed its foundational
methods, proof, and major conclusions. See Ken M. Fritz et al., Physical and Chemical Connectiv-
ity and Streams and Riparian Wetlands to Downstream Waters: A Synthesis, 54(2) J. AMER.
WATER RES. ASS'N 323 (2018).
406. The Act's all-purpose authorization to EPA is "to prescribe such regulations as are nec-
essary to carry out [its] functions" under the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1361(a). But this is independent of
the CWA's special statutory review safe harbor for certain rules. In § 509(b)(1), seven enumerated
types of EPA actions are listed and shielded from "judicial review in any civil or criminal pro-
ceeding for enforcement" if"review could have been obtained" thereunder at the time of the rule-
making. Id. at § 1369(b)(2). Thus, in National Association of Manufacturers. v. Department of
Defense, 138 S. Ct. 617 (2018), the Court held that general federal question jurisdiction in an ap-
propriate district court was the proper forum for challenges to the CWR. Id. at 628-34.
407. Article III arguably requires some kind of judicial review when interests protected by
the Constitution are adjudicated. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative
Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 986-91 (1988) (discussing Crowell v. Benson,
285 U.S. 22, 60-61 (1932), and cases following it); Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adju-
dication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 939 (2011) [hereinafter Merrill, Appellate Review Model] (linking the history of administra-
tive procedure to the rise of deferential judicial review and the Chevron doctrine).
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ters' status categorically.40 8 (Hence the kinetic response.40 9) The rule at-
tracted thousands of participants, considerable media attention, and sev-
eral of Washington's most powerful lobbies in opposition.410 It even fea-
tured in the 2016 election in several states.4 11 And, as mentioned, the
lawsuits challenging it swamped it immediately.4 12 The Trump Admin-
istration's effort to replace the 2015 rule41 3 brings the Connectivity Re-
port full circle--especially in the wake of the Supreme Court's holdings
that both the Corps' and EPA's specific jurisdictional determinations are
"final agency action" and immediately reviewable in federal district
court.
4 14
Administrative action like the Connectivity Report and its place in
Article III proceedings have long divided courts and commentators.
415
One question is whether an Article III court's "judicial Power" should or
408. Unlike other rules, so-called "legislative" rules can create, amend, or abolish legal in-
terests. See Manning, supra note 345, at 914; Gersen, supra note 345, at 1708-13; Funk, supra
note 345, at 659; Merrill & Watts, supra note 345, at 470-74. But cf Strauss, supra note 398, at
1471-75 (noting the existence of a "tertium quid" between rules having and those lacking the force
of law). The Court has regularly declared that legislative rules "have the force and effect of law."
See Perez v. Mrtg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1208 (2015). Although the Court has held that
CWA § 301's effluent limitations mandates delegated to EPA the power to make binding rules on
the discharge of pollutants from point sources to jurisdictional waters, see E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977), it has never resolved the question professors Mer-
rill and Watts posed in 2001: whether the CWA's generic rulemaking grant in § 501(a) constitutes
such a delegation. See Merrill & Watts, supra note 345, at 584 n.634.
409. See Claudia Copeland, Cong. Research Serv., EPA and the Army Corps' Rule to Define
"Waters of the United States, " at 10 (Jan. 4, 2016) (CRS R43455) (reporting agencies' intentions
not to expand jurisdictional reach but surely to "increase the categorical assertion of CWA juris-
diction, when compared to a baseline of current practices under the 2003 and 2008 EPA-Corps
guidance"). The CWR's several categorical exemptions drew environmentalist objections. See
Patrick Parenteau, A Bright Line Mistake: How EPA Bungled the Clean Water Rule, 46 ENVTL. L.
379 (2016).
410. See Final Rule-Clean Water Rule: Definition of "Waters of the United States," 80
Fed. Reg. 37,054, 37,095 (2015) (describing "major comments"); Proposed Rule-Revised Defi-
nition of "Waters of the United States," 84 Fed. Reg. 4154, 4160-62 (2019) (reviewing litigation
history surrounding 2015 rulemaking).
411. See, e.g., Tiffany Stecker, WOTUS 'Ultimately Doomed.' What Happens Next?,
GREENWIRE (Nov. 16, 2016), available at https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060045861.
412. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
413. See Proposed Rule, 84 Fed. Reg. at 4218-20.
414. See U.S. Army Corps ofEng'rs v. Hawkes Co., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1807, 1813-15 (2016);
Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 125-26 (2012).
415. See Fallon, Legislative Courts, supra note 407, at 933-49; Henry Paul Monaghan, Con-
stitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 247-63 (1985); John Dickinson, Crowell v. Ben-
son: Judicial Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80
U. PA. L. REV. 1055 (1932). Jurisdictional facts turn factual into normative disputes and therefore
pose complex questions about the appropriate standards of proof. See Kevin M. Clermont, Juris-
dictional Fact, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 973 (2006).
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can be bound by someone else's fact-finding.4 16 But the better question
is whether federal courts can afford to ignore domain expertise like it.
For if the scientific consensus on connectivity described there poses so
fundamental a challenge to our fictional divisions in waters governance,
it is the fictions that should go. Through its fractious opinions on
§ 502(7) and on the CWA's special statutory review provisions,417 the
Court has embodied the judiciary's incapacity to settle the Act's territo-
rial scope--ceding to fact-driven litigation one tributary, ditch, and wet-
land at a time questions that only general norms can settle generally.4 1
Ironically, challenges to any final Trump rule must now begin in district
court where the forum-shopping incentives loom largest,419 where scal-
ing the relief awarded has become a quagmire,420 amid procedural mis-
matches between the Federal Rules and petitions for review,42 1 and
where the operation of the Court's vague "ripeness" and finality doc-
trines will invite still more disparity and forum-shopping. 422 To attribute
this jurisdictional swamp to Congress is to disparage the work of a co-
equal branch.423
V. PATHS FORWARD
Whether horizontal,424 vertical,425 or diagonal,426 jurisdiction split-
416. Cf KENNETH CULP DAVIS, 2 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 16.08 (1958) (de-
scribing a domain of "jurisdictional facts" which, if found by an administrative agency, merit spc-
cial scrutiny from a reviewing court).
417. Compare Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 593 (1980) (construing the Clean
Air Act to consolidate review in a single court of appeals for its time-saving advantages over dis-
persed review in district courts), with Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 445 U.S. 193 (1980)
(construing CWA § 509(b)(1) to allow appeals court review for same reasons).
418. Hawkes and Sackett cleared the path for burdened landowners' challenges to individual
jurisdictional determinations in district court under § 1331 and the APA. See Hawkes, 136 S. Ct.
at 1812; Sackett, 566 U.S. at 127-31. But neither involved a challenge to an agency "rule"-which
presumably remain subject to the Court's notoriously opaque ripeness doctrines if brought in dis-
trict court. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L. REV.
113, 162-78 (1998).
419. See Samuel L. Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 417, 457-61 (2017); Joseph W. Mead & Nicholas A. Fromherz, Choosing a Court
to Review the Executive, 67 ADMrN. L. REV. 1, 28-30 (2015).
420. See Bray, supra note 419, at 437-45.
421. See Mead & Fromherz, supra note 419, at 28-30.
422. See Daniel Boger, Pre-Enforcement Review: An Evaluation from the Perspective of
Ripeness, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 77, 103-06 (2018).
423. Cf NOURSE, supra note 354, at 101 ("Federal judges-who have no constituency-
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do.") (quoting Chevron, 467
U.S. at 866).
424. Examples of horizontal jurisdiction splitting described above include the CWA
§ 502(7) "waters" delegation to the federal courts and/or agencies; the basin adjudications of
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ting has been acutely problematic in our water conflicts. Yet still it pro-
liferates. It consigns compelling claims for relief to adjudication by rules
of decision that are neither fixed nor forum-relative, accumulating over
time into tangles of unintelligible complexity. With dueling federal and
state sovereign and proprietary interests in most waters, whatever private
rights of use may vest are specially limited not just by rival claimants
but by multiple ranks of competing public claims as well.427 By con-
straining what any claimant can hope to call theirs, even a more elabo-
rate, robust test for constitutional property "denominators ' 42 is not go-
ing to provide much security against divestment or loss.
4 2 9
Paradoxically, this undermines the best reasons for vesting private enti-
tlements in the first place430 while generating considerable frictions that
lock-in legacy arrangements all the same.
431
Concurrent jurisdiction to manage the jealousies and fears our feder-
alism engenders began simply enough.43 2 But dividing popular sover-
eignty over waters has proven far more complicated than the Founders
appreciated.433 Disentangling interrelated, often competing interests
tributaries and aquifers underlying any larger system; and the overlapping powers of Congress and
the Supreme Court to resolve interstate conflicts over shared waters.
425. Examples of vertical jurisdiction splitting described above include the Colorado River
and McCarran Amendment placement of federal common law rights in state courts, e.g., the Big
Horn litigation; exclusive use of the certiorari jurisdiction to reform any federal reclamation law
misconstrued in basin adjudications; and the adjudication of interstate waters' equitable appor-
tionment in the Supreme Court without authority to apportion intrastate uses or related tributaries
or groundwater.
426. The diagonal jurisdiction splitting described above was the Federal Circuit's certifica-
tion of the "vested beneficial interest" claim to the Oregon courts and its eventual remand to the
U.S. Court of Federal Claims.
427. See supra notes 84-142 and accompanying text.
428. See supra notes 250-56 and accompanying text.
429. See supra notes 323-37 and accompanying text. This may explain why so many recla-
mation water users pursue contractual remedies alone. See Benson, supra note 34, at 397-401.
430. See Bray, supra note 209, at 1309-14 (explaining how "clouded ownership" reduces
values overall, not just those of the most likely owner).
431. See supra notes 329-34 and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 240-41 (1900) (taking original jurisdiction
of interstate water pollution claim in part because "it must surely be conceded that, if the health
and comfort of the inhabitants of a state are threatened, the state is the proper party to represent
and defend them").
433. Popular sovereignty has long been tested by its territoriality. See RICHARD TUCK, THE
SLEEPING SOVEREIGN: THE INVENTION OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 221-24 (2015); LACROIX, su-
pra note 101, at 218-21; EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 267-87 (1988). And major river systems were the
original theatre of dispute. See BENTON, supra note 346, at 43-59. As but one strategy to manage
"legal difference," however, extraterritoriality has expanded tremendously since the founding. See
KAL RAUSTIALA, DOES THE CONSTITUTION FOLLOW THE FLAG? THE EVOLUTION OF
TERRITORIALITY IN AMERICAN LAW 21 (2009).
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amidst all the jurisdiction splitting has grown increasingly costly and de-
creasingly effectual in resolving much about the rights, duties, powers,
privileges, and immunities in waters law. Yet the impasses traced here
hardened over decades. From the Supreme Court's equitable apportion-
ment docket to Erie's federal common law revolution to McCarran's
dubious constructions in Colorado River and San Carlos to the condi-
tions on a federal takings forum for reclamation project water, and final-
ly to the courts' hostility toward a watershed-oriented CWA, emerges a
common cause: a faith-whatever the facts-in the health of dividing
authority to declare the law. 434 A waters-focused jurisdictional policy
would target that pathology for treatment over time. 435 A detailed ac-
count must await future work, but this part sketches three distinct reform
pathways.
A. Righting Waters Adjudications
When the Supreme Court found within the McCarran Amendment a
federal policy of avoiding piecemeal litigation,436 it knew too little.437 In
hindsight, general stream adjudications (GSAs) are rarely conclusive.
Tribal and other federal claims to shared waters have lingered unre-
solved while the capacities of the federal courts to alleviate any of the
resultant losses lay dormant on the theory that piecemeal resolution
would be worse.438 But piecemeal resolution of the law in a watershed-
given its diversity and variability-is the only resolution possible. Much
of the money and time spent on the GSAs has been in fear of what fed-
eral reservations or some eventual equitable apportionment might mean
to a state's appropriators. 439 It is now clear that the Court studiously
avoids decreeing interstate apportionments44 ° and that reserved rights
434. Cf DAHL, supra note 11, at 145-51 (finding that frequent turnover in electoral majori-
ties and broad consensus on basic values explains America's protection of minority interests more
than Madison's "institutionalism").
435. Incremental solutions offer the benefits of experimentation. But cf Rubin & Feeley,
supra note 50, at 908-09 (arguing that, because "our political culture is essentially healthy," there
is no "policy reason" that federal administrative subdivisions should not replace semi-autonomous
states).
436. See supra notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
437. The Supreme Court's own jurisprudence may have been the principal reason the gen-
eral stream adjudications expanded to the unmanageable proportions they assumed. See Pacheco,
supra note 134, at 632-35.
438. See supra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
439. See supra notes 166-70 and accompanying text.
440. In the nine river basins it has adjudicated, the Court has entered a decree equitably ap-
portioning flow to affected states only three times. See Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
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are usually the least of an irrigator's worries. 4 4 1
Some have suggested repealing McCarran.442 But GSAs are increas-
ingly self-limiting endeavors. Rarely do they merit the costs or delays
entailed and most are winding down.443 If anything, growing scarcities
and improving knowledge of river systems are likely to bring GSA
judgments into conflict with one another. 444 Going forward, if the Su-
preme Court were to narrow Colorado River and San Carlos,44 5 recog-
nizing that a waiver of immunity from suit in state court vests no author-
ity in federal courts to refuse jurisdiction granted them,446 the
Declaratory Judgment Act44 7 might serve as a useful tool for broken
stream regimes that have interwoven so many claim types.4 48 Federal
common law, from which so many of our waters' ordering principles
stem, has been deeply problematic in state court.44 9 Federal declaratory
actions can at least avoid the reverse-Erie traps and the prickly manage-
(1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419
(1922).
441. See Bryan, supra note 142, 507-16; ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 357, at 24-28;
MacDonnell, supra note 63, at 229-42.
442. See, e.g., Huber & Zellmer, supra note 126, at 289-91; MacDonnell, supra note 63, at
342-45; Pacheco, supra note 134, at 669; McElroy & Davis, supra note 18, at 648.
443. See Feller, supra note 131, 439-40; Thorson et al., Dividing Western Waters H, supra
note 18, at 47-63.
444. See supra notes 207-11 and accompanying text.
445. Colorado River and San Carlos Apache are more easily narrowed than overruled. See
Re, Supreme Court, supra note 187, at 1865 ("[N]arrowing happens all the time, with the approval
of every recent Supreme Court Justice. Indeed, cases are narrowed far more frequently than they
are overruled, as the Court routinely encounters scenarios in which a past decision is worth prun-
ing but not abolishing.").
446. See Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716-20 (1996) (stating that federal
courts may abstain when they possess discretion to grant or withhold relief, including in the de-
claratory judgment context, but that for actions "at law" this will typically only be authority to
delay, not to dismiss, a suit); Shapiro, supra note 165, at 579-80; see also Lexmark Int'l v. Static
Control Comps., Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128-30 (2014) (holding that courts may not limit causes of
action Congress has created merely out ofjudicial "prudence").
447. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-02. As an "anticipatory" remedy, a federal declaratory judgment
may issue only to resolve "a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal inter-
ests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment."
Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007).
448. The Court in Colorado River and San Carlos repeatedly emphasized that the state ad-
judication must provide an adequate forum for every federal issue. See Arizona v. San Carlos
Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545, 559-60 (1983); Colo. River Water Con. Dist. v. United States, 424
U.S. 800, 812, 820 (1976). Where adequate attention is not promised to all federal claims, absten-
tion is inappropriate. See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
26-27 (1983).
449. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
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rial work of equitable decrees. 45 ° It might even be a vehicle for western
water law's waste and forfeiture doctrines finally to drive real innova-
tions for distressed systems. 451
Perhaps most importantly, a federal court can resolve claims on sys-
tems not confined to any single state.452 And because a federal forum's
abstention is only preferable where the law is better fit to a state fo-
rum,4 53 federal common law claims or defenses (or the inchoate sover-
eign interests from which they arise) and interstate boundaries should
make it relatively rare. Indeed, as water rights litigation has matured,
sovereign interests have constantly evolved and influenced water law
and this intersection can only be settled, fully and fairly, in context. 454
Finally, federal courts' jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, alt-
hough generally limited by federal statute and rule to the jurisdiction of
their state,455 may need to protect the interests that state forums can-
not.456 As the Supreme Court's equitable apportionment practice has
450. Cf Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 467-71 (1974) (calling the declaratory judg-
ment "milder" than the injunction because it does not directly constrain the loser); RESTATEMENT
(2D) OF JUDGMENTS § 33 cmt. c (1982) ("A declaratory action is intended to provide a remedy
that is simpler and less harsh than coercive relief, if it appears that a declaration might terminate
the potential controversy.").
451. Cf Bray, supra note 209, at 1309-14 (arguing that cases of clouded ownership are often
uniquely suited to declaratory judgment); Shupe, supra note 69, at 501-11 (tracking how actions
targeting waste would encourage innovations in usage).
452. See, e.g., Brooks v. United States, 119 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1941); United States v. Al-
pine Land & Res. Co., 503 F. Supp. 877 (D. Nev. 1980), rev'don other grounds, Nevada v. Unit-
ed States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983); United States v. Walker River Irr. Dist., 11 F. Supp. 158 (D. Nev.
1935), rev'don other grounds, 104 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1939). Several federal court judgments, at
least one of which was affirmed by the Supreme Court, enjoin (non-forum) upstream state diver-
sions in favor of a resident user in a downstream state. See Brooks, 119 F.2d at 639-43 (upholding
contempt sanctions against out-of-state, out-of-priority users); Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v.
Twin Falls Salmon River Land & Water Co., 254 F. 9, 26-28 (9th Cir. 1917); Rickey Land & Cat-
tle Co. v. Miller & Lux, 152 F. 11 (9th Cir. 1907), aff'd, 218 U.S. 258 (1910); New Liverpool Salt
Co. v. Calif. Dev. Co., 172 F. 792 (9th Cir. 1909). The Tenth Circuit refused to do so in Albion-
Idaho Land Co. v. Naflrr. Co., 97 F.2d 439, 444 (10th Cir. 1938).
453. See supra notes 156-62 and accompanying text.
454. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
455. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 limits the territorial jurisdiction of a district court
(essentially) to that of the state in which it sits, see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(l)(A), although not com-
pletely. See id. 4(k)(1)(B) (allowing summons on persons who are Rule 14 or Rule 19 parties to be
summoned if located within 100 miles of the summoning court's district). This, too, traces to the
Judiciary Act of 1789. See Robertson v. R.R. Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 623 (1925) (citing Judici-
ary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79). Such restrictions could be loosened consistent with
the Constitution. See Jamelle C. Sharpe, Beyond Borders: Disassembling the State-Based Model
of Federal Forum Fairness, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2897 (2009); A. Benjamin Spencer, Nationwide
Personal Jurisdiction for our Federal Courts, 87 DENv. U. L. REV. 325 (2009).
456. General federal interests are quite familiar. Cf McConnell, supra note 10, at 1492-
1500 (listing responsiveness to diverse interests and preferences, minimizing interstate externali-
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shown, these interests have emerged faster than they have been adjudi-
cated.
Although court judgments backing senior "calls" on upstream diver-
sions are nominally limited to their issuing jurisdiction, 457 Western wa-
ters will increasingly test this paradigm.458 Water rights are paradoxical-
ly intangible45 9 and intangible property is famous for challenging
territorial jurisdiction. 460 The situs of its use easily confounds ordinary
theories of tort and territoriality. So, for example, diverted water (which
is rarely fully "consumed" but is rather yielded back in large part) keeps
use practices involving that water of acute and immediate interest to
those downstream. 461 A familiar dilemma is the cumulative effect of a
jurisdiction's irrigators on a river's downstream character and extent,4 6 2
a conflict that, by crossing state lines, raises uniquely federal inter-
ests. 463 A waters-focused jurisdictional policy would generally seek the
highest coincidence of governing law, sovereign interests, and original
jurisdiction-the better to enable timely and effective adjudication of
multiple overlapping and competing interests. If more than one sover-
eign's interests or laws are implicated, that will typically count in favor
of a federal forum, independent federal rules of decision, and/or an in-
clusive conflict-of-laws doctrine.
464
ties, and the spurring of innovation through inter-jurisdictional competition). Sorting them in con-
text can require policy-guided reconstructions of jurisdiction, procedure, and more. See, e.g., Illi-
nois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1251 and Article
Il should be interpreted to restrict original jurisdiction docket to those cases that are "appropriate"
and leaving original jurisdiction over all other cases to district courts); Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems.
Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971) (noting that the emergence of "long-arm" jurisdiction has obviated the
need for original jurisdiction before the Supreme Court in all cases between a State and citizens of
another state).
457. See Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 103 (1938);
Hill v. State, 894 N.W.2d 208, 215-19 (Neb. 2017).
458. See supra notes 284-86 and accompanying text.
459. See supra notes 326-27 and accompanying text. Like money, water is fungible and, for
many purposes, a fungible unit of account. See FOX, supra note 327, 24-25.
460. Cf Stem, supra note 230, at 170-73 (noting that cash and commercial paper ordinarily
follow a "sims" rule but that intellectual property need not do so because federal law ordinarily
prevails and that in most other cases the location of the debtor is decisive); Fox, supra note 327,
at 318 (explaining that enforcement of title to incorporeal money may be sought in restitution).
461. See, e.g., Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. 368, 378-80 (2011); cf Squillace, supra note
326, at 108, 111-14 (proposing to define water rights in consumptive use terms because amounts
diverted are a poor measure for purposes of transferability).
462. See ENVIRON. LAW INST., supra note 357, at 9-10 (discussing City of Thornton v. Bijou
Irr. Co., 926 P.2d I (Colo. 1996)).463. See, e.g., Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 98-102 (1992); Missouri v. Illinois, 180
U.S. 208, 240-41 (1901).
464. Cf Monaghan, supra note 20 (arguing that federal supremacy has always included el-
ements of law like administrative rules, precedents, and other tools nowhere mentioned in the Su-
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B. Jurisdiction by Rule: Fixing the CWA
Madison's signature mistake was in not anticipating the vacuums
formed by so thoroughly constraining the Congress.4 65 The vacuums
have pulled the courts, states, and agencies into updating the law and
that has left delegative statutes like the CWA in jurisdictional knots. The
Supreme Court's handling of CWA jurisdiction has introduced less
"control"4 66 than outright chaos, illustrating just how wrong case-by-
case approaches can go.4 67 Growing uncertainty in the administrative
law of delegation, 468 the CWA's ambiguous grants of authority even to
make jurisdictional rules, and the Court's own opinions about § 502(7)
and ripeness and finality, 469 have reared a jurisdictional mess.
The Act's geographic scope now leaves affected parties to risky de-
cisions, keeps state programs and watershed initiatives perpetually un-
certain of their authority and consigns water users to an increasingly
conflictual future. 47° This is a legacy of adjudications exacerbating un-
certainties where enacted textual rules could improve matters considera-
bly.471 Furthermore, we surely do Article III no credit by refusing to up-
date proof burdens that waste judicial resources through the repetitive
litigation of general knowledge.472 And for all the rhetoric, courts and
agencies have long adapted their roles cooperatively in jointly furthering
Congress's expressed purposes.473 The Court has held, for example, that
it will not accept EPA's sham refusals to act in the face of overwhelm-
premacy Clause that have proven vital to founding and sustaining a nation); Roosevelt, supra note
89, at 10-15 (describing a "two-step model" where a court first identifies the sovereigns that might
attach legal consequences to the events and which have in fact done so to create a conflict and,
secondly, to decide which of the competing rights, duties, powers, privileges, or immunities will
be given priority); Wolff, supra note 132, at 1884-88 (explaining that Roosevelt's two-step ap-
proach to conflicts coincided with the rise of a constitutional doctrine of sovereign interests and
fairness).
465. See McConnell, supra note 10, at 1502.
466. Retaining power over the finding of facts was a key part of the orthodox case for judi-
cial control of the administrative state. See Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 624-53 (1965); see also Merrill, supra note 407, at 979-97.
467. See supra notes 368-96 and accompanying text.
468. See Elliott, supra note 344.
469. See supra notes 417-23 and accompanying text.
470. See Colbum, supra note 357.
471. See Colbum, supra note 39. For example, the Court, Congress, and most everyone else
eventually agreed that codified rules of civil procedure were better for efficiency, fairness, and
transparency-notwithstanding considerable separation of powers questions. See FALLON ET AL.,
supra note 8, at 564-75.
472. See supra notes 415-18 and accompanying text.
473. See Dickinson, supra note 415, at 1074-77; Fallon, supra note 407, at 986-91; Pfander,
supra note 8, at 743-47.
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ing evidence supporting a finding of jurisdiction to regulate. 474
In theory, Congress could fix the turmoil described in Part IV. But
nothing is keeping Article III courts from taking seriously the general
knowledge that watersheds, wetlands, and tributaries are intimately con-
nected to downstream waters and that variance in that connectivity is not
evidence of its absence. 475 Even without a statutory fix for the CWA's
rulemaking provisions, 4 76 especially in the short term, this could mean
real reform incrementally by better aligning the fact-finding to be done
in court with what domain experts have said is well-known about water-
sheds.477
C. Righting Reclamation Interests
Reclamation Act § 8 is in its second century of minting jurisdictional
unicorns like "vested beneficial interests" out of the thin air of state law
and judgments without associated recognition doctrines.471 Any field of
law where federal supremacy is reserved specially for "direct Congres-
sional directives'479 may be destined for troubles. 480 But reclamation
project disputes are growing more frequent and dire. 41i Readying irriga-
tion for increasing scarcity while minimizing the collateral damage is
our challenge. In principle, use changes should be simpler with interests
more transparently packaged and transferrable. 4 2 However, federal tax-
payers' interests in developed water and its infrastructure must be ap-
474. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-32 (2007); cf Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SuP. CT. REV. 51, 52 (calling
Massachusetts "expertise-forcing").
475. But see Orchard Hill Bldg. Co. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 893 F.3d 1017, 1025-26
(7th Cir. 2018) (holding that Corps had not amassed "substantial evidence" of target wetland's
"significant nexus" to river because more than 160 other wetlands in watershed were not proven to
be "similarly situated").
476. Express authority to make binding jurisdictional rules while consolidating review of
those rules in a single circuit, as the CAA does with the D.C. Circuit, would surely increase the
resolution of the ensuing norms. See Mead & Fromherz, supra note 419, at 32-33.
477. See supra notes 402-05 and accompanying text. The Court has perhaps inadvertently
confirmed that the doctrinal tests for reviewable agency action applied in Bennett v. Spear, 520
U.S. 154, 178 (1997), and Sackett v. EPA, 566 U.S. 120, 128-31 (2012), present considerable eq-
uitable discretion. See Lindsay, supra note 46, at 2473 & n.179 (discussing U.S. Army Corps of
Eng'rs v. Hawkes, 136 S. Ct. 1807 (2016)). Timing any reviews of agency policy choices about
§ 502(7)'s scope, thus, should include attention to the systemic troubles described in Part IV.
478. See supra notes 284-98 and accompanying text.
479. California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 670-71 (1978).
480. See supra note 275 and accompanying text.
481. See Kelley & Benson, supra note 290, § 41.05.
482. See Squillace, supra note 326, at 10811; Gould, supra note 68, at 22-25.
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propriately valued and protected.483 Years of study suggest that these
objectives are mutually exclusive in many projects, especially where in-
terstate rivalries are afoot.4 84 Resolving disputes between states through
first-in-time principles, though, arguably violates the losing state's equal
sovereignty.485 Furthermore, investing the finality of a local action over
real property in water rights judgments, though that finality may remain
a "citadel ' 486 to some, comports with little that we have learned about
waters, watersheds, and situs jurisdiction overall.487
Congress last overhauled the Reclamation Act in 1982,488 long be-
fore the troubles Part III traced came into view.48 9 The waiver of federal
immunity for project water disputes remains narrow and technical.490
And the Act does nothing to prioritize uses-which a series of project-
specific statutes has also failed to do.49' Targeted but considerable juris-
dictional reform could stem from courts' hearing claims of state law's
preemption by the Act's residual concept of "beneficial use" as the "ba-
sis, measure, and limit" of project water deliveries.492 That residuum of
483. See Kelley & Benson, supra note 290, § 41.07.
484. See WATER TRANSFERS IN THE WEST, supra note 326, at 27-30 (noting lock-in effects,
path dependence, and the need to study successes in enhancing transferability as individual cases).
485. See Patashnik, supra note 128, at 41-46; cf OWEN, supra note 51, at 229-32 (noting
that Utah's pending application to divert its allocated water in Colorado's upper basin is pressur-
ing California and Arizona which have both long benefitted from Utah's forbearance).
486. Stem, supra note 230, at 115 (calling the situs rule of adjudicating rights to property a
"citadel ... of orthodoxy amid the rubble of the old order" that has since been replaced by more
discriminating conflicts rules for everything but property). Federal court judgments may necessi-
tate a federal preclusion rule. See Semtek Int'l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509
(2001).
487. As the Restatement says, states generally have "power to exercise judicial jurisdiction
to affect interests in an intangible thing ... if the relationship of the state to the thing and to the
parties involved makes exercise of such jurisdiction reasonable." RESTATEMENT (2D) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 65 (1971). The presence of a diversion and/or of beneficial use within a
state may provide an adequate basis for situs jurisdiction yet still be insufficient for exclusive ju-
risdiction. Cf Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (holding that when a state court judg-
ment's being given binding effect would amount to a denial of due process, it becomes the fo-
rum's duty to verify the constitutionality of the conflicts and preclusion rules applied).
488. See Pub. L. No. 97-293, 96 Stat. 1261 (1982), codifiedat 43 U.S.C. §§ 390aa etseq.
489. See Benson, supra note 34, at 395-97.
490. See Orff v. United States, 545 U.S. 596, 601-03 (2005) (holding that 43 U.S.C. § 390uu
is a waiver to join the United States as a "necessary" party in litigation between other parties to a
reclamation contract dispute, not a waiver permitting suits against the United States directly or in
general).
491. See Kelley & Benson, supra note 290, at §§ 41.07(b)-(c).
492. Reclamation Act § 8's "beneficial use" may not be unique in its delegation of some
federal authority to state law. See Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. United States, 657 F.2d 1126, 1133
(10th Cir. 1981) (looking to New Mexico's definition of "beneficial use"). But it must retain at
least a residuum of federal content should the delivery be interstate, see Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 102-03 (1938), or where a forum state lacks the
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federal "beneficial use" could combine with "Little Tucker" jurisdiction
in federal district courts to hear any claims against the United States of
up to $10,000 (the threshold for CFC jurisdiction).4 93 Larger intermedi-
aries with aggregate interests in project water might find this cold com-
fort. But it could provide an appropriate path to resolving the actual us-
ers' beneficial interests in project water that have so often evaded
adjudication and clarification. 494
Elaborating the above must await future work. It is well enough to
have identified the forms of tyranny-by-inaction-invisible to Hobbes
and Madison alike-now threatening our waters. The stakes are clear:
more effort, time, and other resources devoted to jurisdictional strife
mean less for actual governance and problem-solving. Left unchecked,
they will continue to strain the nation's water security and aquatic re-
sources.4 95 The underlying cause, replicated across waters disputes, of
many kinds, has consisted foremost in courts' constant but subtle adap-
tation of the rules of decision, creating convoluted remedial pathways
for injured parties even as the wider legal culture grows increasingly
particularistic about the necessary bases of lawmaking authority. Con-
gress may eventually decide that establishing dedicated federal tribunals
possessed of sufficient original jurisdiction over water interests and wa-
ter rights is the best way to overcome its own problems496 while address-
ing the problems highlighted here. Until that day, though, it will be in-
cumbent upon courts, states, and agencies to begin curbing the
pathological jurisdiction splitting our waters have suffered.
necessary basis for applying its law. Cf Roosevelt, supra note 89, at 24-25 ("There are topics be-
yond the lawmaking power of the states... One such topic is the rights and obligations arising
from events that have no connection to the forum state."). Changes of use in an upstream state
harming users in a downstream state could present yet a third possibility necessitating either fed-
eral law or a neutral conflicts principle. "The range of judicial inventiveness" should be "deter-
mined by the nature of the problem." Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957).
493. See supra note 28.
494. The cases are legion where, because the United States was an indispensable party but
immune from suit, dismissal of the suit ensued.
495. See Larson, supra note 13, at 159-64.
496. See NOURSE, supra note 354, at 25-26 (observing that Congress must speak to its con-
stituencies, courts, agencies and others at the same time and must ordinarily act by supermajority).
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